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DISRUPTING EDUCATION FEDERALISM 
KIMBERLY JENKINS ROBINSON

 
ABSTRACT 
The ongoing expansion of federal influence over education in the 
United States provides a particularly salient time to consider how 
education federalism should be structured to achieve the nation’s 
education goals. One of the nation’s unfulfilled and yet essential education 
goals is to ensure that all students receive equal access to an excellent 
education. A variety of scholars and, most recently, the federal Equity and 
Excellence Commission have offered proposals for advancing this goal. 
By building on this growing momentum for reform, I argue that disrupting 
the nation’s longstanding approach to education federalism—which I 
define as the balance of power between federal, state, and local 
governments that emphasizes substantial state autonomy over education—
is necessary for a successful national effort to achieve this goal. I then 
provide a foundational theory for strengthening the federal role in 
education by analyzing the essential elements of a successful reform effort 
based upon research regarding the strengths of federal education 
policymaking and upon identification of the missing elements of current 
reforms. Finally, I respond to many of the potential arguments against 
disrupting education federalism. For instance, I argue that National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius continues to provide 
ample room for Congress to expand the federal role in education in ways 
that are needed to build a more equitable education system. I also explain 
that although strengthening the federal role in education will reduce some 
forms of state and local control over education, it also will provide states 
and localities new forms of control.  
 
 
  Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I am thankful for the insightful 
comments from Margaret Bacigal, Tara Casey, Jessica Erickson, Jim Gibson, Meredith Harbach, Joyce 
Janto, William Koski, Corinna Lain, Martha Minow, Daniel Murphy, Eloise Pasachoff, Wendy 
Perdue, James Ryan, and Kevin Walsh. I also received excellent research assistance from Nick 
Dantonio, Adam Pratt, Jon Phenix, and Kathleen Travis. Many thanks also to Dean Wendy Perdue for 
her support of research assistance for this project.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States continues to tolerate a longstanding educational 
opportunity gap. Today, it relegates at least ten million students in low-
income neighborhoods and millions more minority students to poorly 
performing teachers, substandard facilities, and other inferior educational 
opportunities.
1
 This occurs in part because the United States invests more 
money in high-income districts than in low-income districts, a sharp 
contrast to other developed nations.
2
 Scholars and court decisions also 
have documented the sizeable intrastate disparities in educational 
opportunity.
3
 In addition, interstate inequalities in educational opportunity 
represent the largest component of disparities in educational opportunity.
4
 
The harmful nature of interstate disparities falls hardest on disadvantaged 
schoolchildren who have the most educational needs,
5
 and states do not 
 
 
 1. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A STRATEGY FOR 
EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 14 (2013). 
 2. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REMEDIAL EDUCATION: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY 4 
(2013). 
 3. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995); Tenn. Small 
Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232, 234–35 (Tenn. 2002); WAYNE AU, UNEQUAL BY DESIGN: 
HIGH-STAKES TESTING AND THE STANDARDIZATION OF INEQUALITY 140 (Michael W. Apple ed., 
2009); JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE 
STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICAN 127 (2010); Goodwin Liu, Interstate 
Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 2068 (2006). 
 4. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 332 
(2006); see also BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL 
REPORT CARD 11–12 tbl. 2 (3d ed. 2014) (showing per pupil state expenditures on elementary and 
secondary education). 
 5. Liu, supra note 4, at 333–34.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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possess the resources and capacity to address the full scope of these 
disparities.
6
 Furthermore, research confirms that as the gap in wealth has 
grown between low-income and high-income families, the achievement 
gap between children in low-income and high-income families also has 
widened.
7
  
Although equal educational opportunity remains a central goal of the 
U.S. education system, it has never been realized.
8
 Indeed, the United 
States relies heavily on schools to overcome the influence of a child’s 
circumstances, such as family income and structure, on life opportunities 
despite evidence that schools are not effectively serving this function.
9
 
Fulfilling the goal of equal educational opportunity will become 
increasingly important to the nation’s interests given research that reveals 
that the United States will need more highly skilled workers to fill jobs 
that meet the economy’s demands. This research also indicates that the 
achievement gap must be closed to ensure that students from rapidly 
growing minority communities possess the educational skills necessary to 
contribute to the economy.
10
 
The nation’s approach to education federalism—which I define as a 
balance of power between the federal, state and local governments that 
emphasizes substantial state autonomy over education—has played a 
significant and influential role in undermining federal reforms that have 
attempted to address disparities in educational opportunity.
11
 In a recent 
article, I examined how the nation’s approach to education federalism 
served as one of the principal obstacles to three of the most comprehensive 
federal attempts to advance equal educational opportunity: school 
desegregation, federal school finance litigation, and the No Child Left 
 
 
 6. Richard Rothstein, New Federal Roles in Education, in THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE 
IN ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION 37, 39 (2001); Liu, supra note 4, at 333–34; Liu, supra 
note 3, at 2082–85, 2089.  
 7. GREG J. DUNCAN & RICHARD J. MURNANE, RESTORING OPPORTUNITY: THE CRISIS OF 
INEQUALITY AND THE CHALLENGE FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION 1–2 (2014); Sean F. Reardon, The 
Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible 
Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?: RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE 
CHANCES 91, 91 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011) [hereinafter WHITHER 
OPPORTUNITY?]. 
 8. MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF, MOVING EVERY CHILD AHEAD: FROM NCLB 
HYPE TO MEANINGFUL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 13 (2008). 
 9. See DUNCAN & MURNANE, supra note 7, at 2.  
 10. Thomas Bailey, Implications of Educational Inequality in a Global Economy, in THE PRICE 
WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION 74, 78–79, 92 (Clive 
R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE PRICE WE PAY]. 
 11. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 287, 290 (2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/7
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Behind Act.
12
 Although some contend that these decisions and results are 
driven more by a lack of political will rather than education federalism,
13
 
the consistency with which federalism has arisen as a real or imagined 
obstacle to reforms aimed at ensuring equal educational opportunity 
suggests that it is a significant contributing factor even if other factors also 
adversely influenced these reforms. 
Given this compelling history and the nation’s deeply entrenched 
educational opportunity gap, I propose a theory for strategically 
restructuring and strengthening the federal role in education in the United 
States to establish the necessary foundation for a national effort to ensure 
equal access to an excellent education. This restructuring and 
strengthening of the federal role in education will disrupt the nation’s 
longstanding approach to education federalism because it would require 
shifting the balance of power in education away from the state and local 
governments and toward the federal government. The United States would 
then need to adopt a new understanding of education federalism that 
embraces the federal government as the guarantor of equal opportunity 
because it is the only government with the capacity and sufficient 
incentive to lead a national effort to achieve this widely supported—yet 
persistently elusive—goal. Although this would not require federalizing 
the nation’s education system as at least one scholar has recommended,14 it 
would require acceptance of a larger federal role in education to hold the 
states accountable for ensuring that all students receive equal access to an 
excellent education. 
Throughout this Article, I define equal access to an excellent education 
as the opportunity for all students to attend a high-quality school that 
enables them to effectively pursue their life goals, to become engaged 
citizens, and to develop their abilities to their full potential.
15
 Equal access 
to an excellent education includes enabling all students to receive “a real 
and meaningful opportunity to achieve rigorous college- and career-ready 
standards.”16 If the United States pursues equal access to an excellent 
education as the primary goal for its education system, it will break the 
traditional link between low-income and minority status and inferior 
 
 
 12. Id. at 297–307, 309–14, 323–30. The Equity and Excellence Commission also noted that 
local control of education has hindered efforts to promote educational equity. See EQUITY & 
EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 34. 
 13. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 111 
(2004). 
 14. See Thomas Kleven, Federalizing Public Education, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 407 (2010). 
 15. See Robinson, infra note 37, at 1712.  
 16. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 12. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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educational opportunities.
17
 This goal recognizes that educational 
opportunities should be tailored to meet the individual needs of students 
that may vary dramatically depending on a variety of factors, including 
family structure and stability, students’ health and nutrition, and 
neighborhood climate.
18
 This goal also embraces closing opportunity gaps 
as an essential prerequisite for closing achievement gaps.
19
 Incentivizing 
and embracing racially and economically diverse schools is essential for 
achieving this goal because of compelling research regarding the harms of 
racial and class isolation, the benefits of diversity, and evidence that 
diverse schools provide important educational benefits that cannot be 
duplicated by alternative reforms.
20
 An excellent education for all 
schoolchildren should be the nation’s ultimate education goal because all 
families ultimately want a first-rate education for their children and the 
United States would benefit economically, socially, and politically from 
providing such an education. 
I contend that both the executive branch and Congress can significantly 
restructure and expand their authority over education under the Spending 
Clause even though the United States Supreme Court, for the first time, 
has placed limitations on Spending Clause legislation in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.
21
 As Part III explains, the 
broad parameters established by the Court for Spending Clause legislation 
in the decision would provide Congress and the executive branch ample 
room to take action that would strengthen federal authority over education 
in ways that would not run afoul of the Constitution. In reaching this 
conclusion, I agree with other scholars who contend that for the Court to 
find a statute unconstitutional in the future, a statute would need to include 
 
 
 17. Janice Petrovich, The Shifting Terrain of Educational Policy: Why We Must Bring Equity 
Back, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK: RESEARCH FOR A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 3, 
12 (Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2005) [hereinafter BRINGING EQUITY BACK].  
 18. See Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane, Introduction: The American Dream, Then and 
Now, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 7, at 3, 15; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 30–33. 
 19. See LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S 
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 73–74 (2010). 
 20. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION: SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY AS AN EDUCATION REFORM STRATEGY 1, 3 (Richard D. 
Kahlenberg ed., 2012); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts 
to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 277, 327–36 (2009); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: 
POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 7 (2005); RYAN, supra note 3, at 278–80.  
 21. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07 (2012) (plurality opinion) (the Medicaid expansion that required 
states to insure anyone under age 65 with an income of less than 133 percent of the federal poverty line 
was unconstitutionally coercive in violation of the Spending Clause); see id. at 2664–67 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/7
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each of the factors that the plurality found troubling in National 
Federation of Independent Business rather than any one of those factors in 
isolation.
22
 
My theory for disrupting education federalism is particularly timely for 
two reasons. First, the United States is undergoing an unprecedented 
expansion of the federal role in education and an accompanying shift in its 
approach to education federalism. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009,
23
 also known as the stimulus bill, authorized an 
unprecedented $100 billion to invest in education funding, tuition tax 
credits, and college grants which President Obama trumpeted as “the 
largest investment in education in our nation’s history.”24 The stimulus bill 
included $4.35 billion for the Race to the Top (RTTT) program, which 
represented far more discretionary funding than all of Secretary of 
Education Arne Duncan’s predecessors.25 Although RTTT has its 
shortcomings,
26
 it has sparked significant education reform, including 
greater state support for the common core standards, charter schools, and 
revisions to state laws regarding the use of student testing data to evaluate 
teachers.
27
 In a number of states and districts, the two years following the 
 
 
 22. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 
101 GEO. L.J. 861, 871 (2013); Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius: The 
Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 594 (2013).  
 23. Pub. L. No. 111-5; 123 Stat. 115.  
 24. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President and the 
Vice President at a Meeting with Nation’s Mayors (Feb. 19, 2009) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ 
press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-and-Vice-President-at-Meeting-with-Nations-Mayors/); see Sam 
Dillon, For Education Chief, Stimulus Means Power, Money and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at 
A1; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Duncan Hails Passage of President’s Stimulus Package, Cites 
“Historic Opportunity to Create Jobs and Advance Reform” (Feb. 18, 2009) (http://www.ed.gov/news/ 
press-releases/duncan-hails-passage-presidents-stimulus-package-cites-historic-opportunity-crea, archived 
at http://perma.cc/3JCZ-86NS). 
 25. See Race to the Top Fund: Notice of Final Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688 (Nov. 18, 2009); 
Grover Whitehurst, Panel Remarks, A Discussion with Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (May 11, 
2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2009/5/11educationduncan/20090511_education_ 
transcript_corrected.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6PKF-D47S.  
 26. See, e.g., Jamie Gullen, Note, Colorblind Education Reform: How Race-Neutral Policies 
Perpetuate Segregation and Why Voluntary Integration Should Be Put Back on the Reform Agenda, 15 
U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 251, 264–65 (2012) (arguing that RTTT does not benefit many children 
who need education reform and funding and that children in losing states will be omitted from the 
reforms that it incentivizes); Patrick McGuinn, Stimulating Reform: Race to the Top, Competitive 
Grants and the Obama Education Agenda, 26 EDUC. POL’Y 136, 143–47 (2012) (noting some of the 
implementation challenges for RTTT, including the absence of new enforcement tools for the U.S. 
Department of Education and political opposition to the reforms). 
 27. See Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 92, 146 (2013); McGuinn, supra note 26, at 143–47. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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creation of RTTT sparked more reform than those locations had seen in 
the preceding twenty years.
28
 
The stimulus bill built on the substantial expansion of the federal role 
in education created by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).
29
 
NCLB represents the most expansive education reform law in the history 
of the United States.
30
 For example, the law’s far-reaching provisions 
required annual testing in math and reading in third through eighth grade 
and once in grades ten through twelve and periodically in science.
31
 The 
law also instituted public reporting of results of student assessments on the 
content of state standards, launched disaggregation of this data for a 
variety of student characteristics including race and ethnicity, created 
accountability interventions for Title I schools, and set minimum 
requirements for highly qualified teachers.
32
 Although NCLB also 
established a new federal role in education, it did not provide an 
accompanying new understanding of education federalism that could help 
to guide this role.
33
 Given congressional failure to reauthorize the law in a 
timely manner, the U.S. Department of Education continues to wield this 
expansive federal authority through waivers of NCLB requirements if 
states will agree to new conditions on the receipt of federal aid.
34
  
Second, my theory is particularly timely given the current national 
focus on improving educational performance of poor schoolchildren and 
reducing achievement and opportunity gaps.
35
 For instance, a 2013 report 
from the Equity and Excellence Commission, a panel of education policy 
experts convened by President Barack Obama, proposed a variety of far 
reaching reforms that would greatly expand federal responsibility for 
ensuring equal educational opportunity.
36
 Scholars similarly have offered a 
variety of thoughtful proposals for how to reduce the opportunity gap that 
 
 
 28. Mike Johnston, From Regulation to Results: Shifting American Education from Inputs to 
Outcomes, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 195, 206 (2011). 
 29. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 30. PATRICK J. MCGUINN, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL 
EDUCATION POLICY, 1965–2005, at 1, 195 (2006). 
 31. 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2012). 
 32. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311, 6319 (2012). 
 33. See Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the Notion of 
Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 26–27 (2010). 
 34. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 
279–81 (2013).  
 35. See DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY: DID FEDERAL 
REGULATION FIX THE SCHOOLS? 10 (2009); RYAN, supra note 3, at 277; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE 
COMM’N, supra note 1, at 14. 
 36. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/7
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would require greatly expanding federal authority over education and 
thereby restructuring education federalism.
37
  
This Article strengthens these calls for reform in three critical ways. 
First, it explains why disrupting education federalism is necessary for a 
successful national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent education. 
Second, it identifies the essential elements for a successful comprehensive 
effort to achieve this goal. Finally, it responds to many of the common 
arguments against expanding the federal role in education and highlights 
the benefits that could be obtained through a restructuring of education 
federalism. In so doing, I provide a theory of education federalism for 
reforms that seek to reduce achievement and opportunity gaps by 
strengthening the federal role in education.
38
 
In offering a theory for how education federalism should be 
restructured to strengthen the federal role over education, and thus reduce 
reliance on states to ensure equal access to an excellent education, I build 
upon Yale Law Professor Heather Gerken’s argument that federalism 
theory should eschew advancing a single theory for all occasions because 
“[b]oth in theory and practice . . . there are many federalisms, not one.”39 
She astutely contends that scholars developing and critiquing federalism 
theory should consider the appropriate balance of institutional 
arrangements for a specific context.
40
 Therefore, my theory for how 
 
 
 37. For instance, in a prior work, I developed a collaborative enforcement model for 
congressional legislation that would guarantee a federal right to education and that would require 
consistent federal oversight and support of state efforts to provide this right. Kimberly Jenkins 
Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1715–22 (2007). Education law scholar and now California Supreme Court 
Justice Goodwin Liu has argued that Congress should ensure “educational adequacy for equal 
citizenship.” Liu, supra note 3, at 2049 (italics omitted). Michael Rebell and Jessica Wolff have 
proposed greater federal involvement in education that would require a joint federal-state effort to 
ensure that all children receive a meaningful educational opportunity and adequate funds for the 
education of all at-risk children. See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 152. Education scholar 
Richard Rothstein recently proposed that “[i]t could . . . be a unique and necessary federal role to 
equalize per pupil spending between states, with the federal government subsidizing elementary and 
secondary education in low-spending states” and that this should represent “a federal role on which 
everyone can agree.” Rothstein, supra note 6, at 38.  
 38. “Through its spending power, the federal government is boldly raising its voice in education. 
The states have all accepted this federal role, incorporating federal goals into their own education 
plans. . . . The field is thus ripe for new theories of federalism.” Benton Martin, An Increased Role for 
the Department of Education in Addressing Federalism Concerns, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 79, 80 
(footnotes omitted). 
 39. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1561 (2012). 
 40. Heather Gerken insightfully argues that  
Federalism debates are best understood not as disagreements over which model to choose but 
as disputes over how to strike the right balance between different types of institutional 
arrangements. Such debates, however, can only be hashed out in context—domain by domain, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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education federalism should be restructured does not attempt to propose a 
federalism theory for other policymaking arenas such as environmental 
law or healthcare policy. Instead, it solely proposes a shift in the balance 
of federal, state, and local authority in order to strengthen the federal role 
in ensuring equal access to an excellent education while preserving the 
aspects of state and local autonomy over education that do not undermine 
equal access to an excellent education.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes the current 
structure of education federalism and notes the major trends that have 
shaped it. It contends that although some praise education federalism for 
its numerous benefits, oftentimes these benefits have not been realized. 
Part I offers five reasons that the United States should consider 
reexamining its longstanding approach to education federalism. Part II 
provides my theory for restructuring education federalism that embraces 
strengthening federal responsibility and support for ensuring equal access 
to an excellent education. Part III responds to some of the possible 
critiques of my theory, including an explanation of why I do not 
recommend a change in education doctrine and instead look to the 
legislative and executive branches to strengthen the federal role in 
education.  
I. THE CASE FOR REEXAMINING EDUCATION FEDERALISM 
This Part describes the trends that have shaped the structure of 
education federalism. It also notes some of the benefits that the current 
approach to education federalism is supposed to provide. This Part then 
offers compelling reasons why the nation should reexamine education 
federalism as a means to pursue a national reform agenda to ensure equal 
access to an excellent education.  
A. The Benefits of the Current Structure of Education Federalism 
Historically, the hallmarks of education federalism within the United 
States have been decentralized state and local control over public schools 
 
 
policymaking arena by policymaking arena. Generic calls for one approach or another simply 
cannot do the trick. Shifting the debate along these lines would lead us to focus our attention 
on a more productive set of questions. We would spend more of our time analyzing which 
flavor of federalism best fits a given context and less time pushing a single theory. 
Id. at 1552. 
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and a limited federal role.
41
 The constitutional foundations for this 
approach lie in the omission of education from the purview of federal 
authority and the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of state authority in all 
areas that the Constitution does not assign to Congress.
42
 However, 
education federalism has undergone three substantial transformations in 
recent decades. 
First, the federal role in education has grown exponentially from its 
original narrow role. After Brown v. Board of Education,
43
 Congress 
passed several statutes that fostered federal responsibility for equal 
educational opportunity, including the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965.
44
 In the last two decades, Congress has expanded 
the federal role to encourage higher standards and greater accountability 
for the education of all children, most recently through NCLB and its 
waivers and the RTTT program.
45
 Indeed, the current reach of federal 
influence in education extends from the classroom to the state capitol. 
Second, state control over education has risen substantially over the 
last half century or more of school reform. School finance litigation and 
reform encouraged centralization of education authority with state officials 
who eventually became the primary funders of public schools.
46
 States 
currently contribute 45.2% of school funding and local government 
 
 
 41. See Carl F. Kaestle, Federal Education Policy and the Changing National Polity for 
Education, 1957–2007, in TO EDUCATE A NATION: FEDERAL AND NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF SCHOOL 
REFORM 17, 17 (Carl F. Kaestle & Alyssa E. Lodewick eds., 2007). 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. X; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 43. 
 43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 44. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see 
also Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified 
as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–09 (2012)); Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701–58 (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 
No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012)); Michael W. Kirst, 
Turning Points: A History of American School Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE? THE 
TANGLED WEB OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 14, 22–23 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004) [hereinafter 
WHO’S IN CHARGE]; CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION: 
WHY IT BEGAN & WHY IT’S STILL NEEDED 8–9 (1999).  
 45. See 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2012); No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 
115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Race to the Top Fund: Notice 
of Final Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,668, 59,688 (Nov. 18, 2009); MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 1, 180–
81, 193–95; Barron & Rakoff, supra note 34, at 279–81.  
 46. See Paul T. Hill, Recovering from an Accident: Repairing Governance with Comparative 
Advantage, in WHO’S IN CHARGE, supra note 44, at 75, 77; Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State 
Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1402–03 (2010); Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 
HOW. L.J. 705, 730–31 (2004); Kirst, supra note 44, at 27. 
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provides 44.6%.
47
 The federal government provides 10.2% of funds for 
education
48
 and this represents an increase in federal education funding 
over the last decade, although not a steady increase.
49
 The increase in the 
state proportion of funding led to an increase in state authority over 
schools.
50
 State-created standards and tests also have expanded state 
influence over the curriculum.
51
 
Finally, the third trend necessarily follows from the first two trends. 
The rise in federal and state authority over education has led to a 
substantial decrease in local control of schools for the last half century.
52
 
Local authority over education is primarily focused on the daily 
administrative responsibilities for running schools.
53
 Most local school 
boards also may raise funds for public schools through property taxes.
54
 
The nation’s current approach to education federalism has been praised 
for its ability to reap several benefits. For instance, some find this 
approach superior based upon Justice Brandeis’s view that state and local 
governments may serve as experimental “laboratories” that can help to 
solve the nation’s economic and social challenges.55 States and localities 
have adopted a diverse array of governance structures for education that 
are designed to respond to state and local interests and preferences.
56
 This 
 
 
 47. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2011–12 (FISCAL YEAR 2012), at 2, 4 tbl. 
1 (Jan., 2015), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014301.pdf. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Regina R. Umpstead, The No Child Left Behind Act: Is it an Unfunded Mandate or a 
Promotion of Federal Educational Ideals?, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 201–02 (2008); NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS, Digest of Education Statistics: 2011, tbl. D (May, 2012), http://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/digest/d11/ch_4.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/BGN3-C2M5. 
 50. See Hill, supra note 46, at 77. 
 51. See Kirst, supra note 44, at 36–37. For instance, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed an increase 
in state standards for student test performance, curricular and program mandates, and behavioral 
requirements, such as attendance, homework and discipline. See id. at 37.  
 52. See James E. Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal Boundaries of 
Education Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE, supra note 44, at 42, 60; Michael Heise, The Political 
Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125, 131–32 (2006); Kirst, supra note 44, at 32.  
 53. See Hill, supra note 46, at 78; Ryan, supra note 52, at 57. In addition, school boards are 
responsible for such areas as hiring and supervising staff; constructing, acquiring and maintaining 
school buildings; acquiring and managing funding; enforcing attendance laws; implementing federal 
and state categorical programs and court orders; obtaining and managing vendor contracts; and 
transporting students. See Hill, supra note 46, at 78. 
 54. See Ryan, supra note 52, at 57; Heise, supra note 52, at 130. 
 55. Heise, supra note 52, at 131 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Pinder, supra note 33, at 36. 
 56. PAUL MANNA, COLLISION COURSE: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY MEETS STATE AND LOCAL 
REALITIES 12–14 (2011) [hereinafter COLLISION COURSE]; Heise, supra note 52, at 131. 
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decentralization also allows state and local governments to adopt a variety 
of curricula, teaching, and learning approaches.
57
  
Some also praise the current structure of education federalism for its 
ability to produce the most effective outcomes. For example, proponents 
of localism, such as legal theory and local government scholar Gerald 
Frug, contend that local decision making can produce more effective 
policy reforms because those most affected by the decision shape the 
reform.
58
 Others contend that a decentralized approach to education is 
more effective at identifying the most successful educational methods 
given the existing uncertainties regarding how best to educate children.
59
 
Localism also can create an efficient allocation of goods and services.
60
 
Efficiency results from the ability of local governments to compete for 
citizens by offering an attractive array of public services.
61
 Within 
education, when localities offer diverse learning options, some citizens can 
shop for the best schools or relocate so that their children can attend 
schools that most effectively serves their educational needs.
62
  
Additionally, state and local control over education is commended for 
its ability to foster greater accountability to citizens.
63
 Individuals exert 
greater influence over local government policy than federal or state 
government.
64
 Local control can enable parents to become involved in and 
influence their child’s education and school.65 Parents regularly interact 
with and monitor their child’s school and this involvement can improve 
student performance.
66
 This involvement also can foster a stronger 
community as parents interact with other parents and their children.
67
  
 
 
 57. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 13. 
 58. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068–69 (1980). 
 59. See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 518–19 
(2010). 
 60. Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in Education Through the No 
Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 632 (2011) (citing 
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 417 (1956)).  
 61. See Tiebout, supra note 60, at 418. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Heise, supra note 52, at 131. 
 64. See Kirst, supra note 44, at 38. 
 65. See Saiger, supra note 59, at 519–20; Wilson, supra note 60, at 632–33. 
 66. Saiger, supra note 59, at 519–20. 
 67. Id. at 520. 
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Finally, the tradition of local control of education remains an important 
value for many within the American public.
68
 Many view state and local 
control over public elementary and secondary education as a central 
component of state and local government.
69
 While public opinion polls 
reveal an increasing comfort with federal involvement in education, the 
polls continue to indicate that Americans generally prefer state and local 
control over education.
70
 This preference influences the avenues for 
reconstructing education federalism that I explore. In addition, state and 
local authority over education has resulted in diversity in education 
governance that influences how the federal government can impact 
education.
71
  
B. Five Reasons for Reexamining Education Federalism 
Given these benefits, why should the nation reexamine the structure of 
education federalism and consider increasing federal authority over 
education as part of a national plan to ensure equal access to an excellent 
education? This reexamination is needed for at least five reasons.  
1. Education Federalism Does Not Consistently Reap Some of the 
Benefits It Is Designed to Achieve 
Although education federalism undoubtedly reaps some of the benefits 
that it is designed to accomplish,
72
 the current approach does not 
consistently yield the benefits that it is supposed to secure. For instance, 
education federalism has been praised for its ability to allow the state and 
local governments to serve as “laboratories” of reform. However, research 
reveals that in the area of school finance reform, most of the changes have 
been fairly limited in scope, and that the reliance on property taxes to fund 
 
 
 68. Kaestle, supra note 41, at 20; Kirst, supra note 44, at 16; COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, 
at 11. 
 69. Heise, supra note 52, at 131. 
 70. See Rebecca Jacobsen & Andrew Saultz, The Polls, Trends: Who Should Control 
Education?, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 379, 388 (2012). 
 71. Cf. COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 13 (noting that “the diverse institutional terrain on 
which federal policy operates” influenced NCLB’s impact). 
 72. See Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: How 
Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1529–33 (2011); Hill, supra note 46, 
at 86 tbl.4-1 (highlighting the comparative advantage of various levels of educational governance); 
Kirst, supra note 44, at 38–39 (noting that citizens have greater opportunity to influence policy in their 
local school districts). 
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schools remains the prevailing method for local funding of schools.
73
 This 
method has continued despite the Supreme Court’s 1973 call for school 
finance reform in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: 
The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have 
relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And 
certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, 
and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality 
and greater uniformity of opportunity.
74
  
Even when plaintiffs have prevailed in litigation that sought to reform 
school finance systems, most states typically have maintained the same 
fundamental and unequal structure for school finance.
75
 Additionally, in a 
substantial majority of the states, funding inequities between wealthy and 
poor districts and schools persist.
76
 Only fourteen states provide more 
funding to districts with high concentrations of poverty than those with 
low concentrations of poverty,
77
 despite consistent research that low-
income students require more resources for a successful education than 
their more affluent peers.
78
 The 2013 Equity and Excellence Commission 
report confirms this lack of additional funding to students who live in high 
poverty concentrations and notes that substantial reform is needed 
because, apart from a few exceptions, states fail to link their school 
finance systems to the costs that they would need to invest to educate all 
children in compliance with state standards.
79
 Given decades of reforms 
that have not made consistent and substantial inroads on these challenges, 
the states are not serving as effective “laboratories” for school finance 
reform.  
Education federalism also is supposed to yield an efficient and 
effective education system. However, the education system regularly falls 
 
 
 73. See BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, THE COURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED EDUCATION 
REFORM 123 (2008); Deborah A. Verstegen & Teresa S. Jordan, A Fifty-State Survey of School 
Finance Policies and Programs: An Overview, 34 J. EDUC. FIN. 213, 215 (2009); RYAN, supra note 3, 
at 153, 171–72.  
 74. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973). 
 75. See Marilyn Gittell, The Politics of Equity in Urban School Reform, in BRINGING EQUITY 
BACK, supra note 17, at 16, 38; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past, Present, and Future of Equal 
Educational Opportunity: A Call for a New Theory of Education Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 
437–38 (2012) (reviewing RYAN, supra note 3); Black, supra note 46, at 1371; Robinson, supra note 
11, at 318–22. 
 76. Gittell, supra note 75, at 26; RYAN, supra note 3, at 127.  
 77. BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 17 fig.3 (examining 2011 school expenditure data). 
 78. RYAN, supra note 3, at 158. 
 79. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
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short of achieving these goals.
80
 The substantial percentage of poorly 
educated students inflicts substantial costs upon the United States, 
resulting in numerous inefficiencies.
81
 For example, as I have noted in 
prior scholarship,
82
 increasing the high school graduation rate could save 
the nation between $7.9 and $10.8 billion annually in food stamps, 
housing assistance and welfare assistance.
83
 The nation forfeits $156 
billion in income and tax revenues during the life span of each annual 
cohort of students who do not graduate from high school.
84
 This cohort 
also costs the public $23 billion in health care costs and $110 billion in 
diminished health quality and longevity.
85
 By increasing the high school 
graduation rate by one percent for men aged twenty to sixty, the nation 
could save $1.4 billion each year from reduced criminal behavior.
86
 Given 
this research, ineffective schools inflict high costs upon the nation—costs 
that it cannot afford as it wrestles with predicted long-term growth in the 
deficit and significant, yet declining, unemployment.
87
 
Local participation in the governance of school districts also is quite 
low. The growing federal and state influence over education has led some 
scholars to contend that “local control” no longer exists within American 
education and, in fact, it has not existed for quite some time.
 88
 Education 
federalism also has led to varying levels of local control for different 
communities, with low-income and minority communities oftentimes 
experiencing the least local control. In low-income communities, 
community participation regularly can yield little influence due to the lack 
 
 
 80. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 19, at 23–26. 
 81. See id.  
 82. Robinson, supra note 75, at 429–31 (reviewing RYAN, supra note 3). 
 83. Jane Waldfogel et al., Welfare and the Costs of Public Assistance, in THE PRICE WE PAY, 
supra note 10, at 160, 173. This estimate is based upon ensuring that all students graduate with a high 
school degree and one third of dropouts obtain some education beyond high school. See id. 
 84. Cecilia Elena Rouse, Consequences for the Labor Market, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 
10, at 99, 101. 
 85. Peter Muennig, Consequences in Health Status and Costs, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 
10, at 125, 137. 
 86. Enrico Moretti, Crime and the Costs of Criminal Justice, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 
10, at 142, 157. Along with early behavioral problems, low educational attainment also can help to 
predict later involvement in criminal activity. Greg J. Duncan & Katherine Magnuson, The Nature and 
Impact of Early Achievement Skills, Attention Skills, and Behavior Problems, in WHITHER 
OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 7, at 47, 63. 
 87. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2013 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 2–3, 13 (2013); Press 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—March 2015 (Apr. 3, 2015) 
(http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf), archived at http://perma.cc/LAK5-Y9A5; Dionne 
Searcey, Job Growth Fails to Help Paychecks of Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2015, at B1.  
 88. Ryan, supra note 52, at 60; Heise, supra note 52, at 131. 
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of political power and financial means of residents.
89
 Low-income citizens 
also cannot influence local or state governments to enact favorable policies 
and reforms when these governments lack the funds for implementation.
90
 
Parents also do not enjoy an unfettered ability to choose their child’s 
school.
91
 Although the quality of schools certainly influences where many 
families purchase homes, low-income families typically lack the financial 
ability to choose the best schools because such schools are zoned for more 
expensive housing options.
92
 
Local participation in the governance of school districts also fails to 
yield the accountability that it is supposed to secure. Research reveals that 
local participation in school board elections and governance can be quite 
limited.
93
 Typically, no more than ten to fifteen percent of voters 
participate in school board elections.
94
 School board meetings also 
oftentimes experience low citizen attendance.
95
 Even the structure of many 
school board meetings limits public discussion and often public discussion 
does not influence board decisions.
96
 Research also has found that many 
who support the concept of locally controlled school boards do not 
understand the functions of school boards or support the school boards in 
their communities.
97
  
In noting that education federalism does not consistently yield the 
benefits that it is designed to secure, I am not suggesting that it does not 
yield some important benefits. Certainly, the decentralized nature of the 
American education system fosters some state and local experimentation 
and innovation, such as curricular reform, teaching innovations, and other 
state and local reforms.
98
 One need look no further than the effectiveness 
 
 
 89. Wilson, supra note 60, at 633. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 634. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 633.  
 94. See Kirst, supra note 44, at 38. 
 95. Wilson, supra note 60, at 633. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Kirst, supra note 44, at 38. 
 98. See Henry M. Levin, Multiple “Choice” Questions: The Road Ahead, in WHO’S IN CHARGE, 
supra note 44, at 228, 231 (describing the expansion in school choice models from the 1970s through 
the 1990s); COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCH. OFFICERS, SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE STATES: A POLICY 
LANDSCAPE 9–13 (2013) (analyzing state opportunities to participate in the eleven most common types 
of school choice); INST. FOR YOUTH, EDUC. & FAMILIES, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, EDUCATIONAL 
ALIGNMENT FOR YOUNG CHILDREN: PROFILES OF LOCAL INNOVATION 1 (2012) (examining successful 
efforts by individual cities to improve educational success by aligning early childhood education with 
K–12 education programs); Gerard Toussaint Robinson, Can the Spirit of Brown Survive in the Era of 
School Choice?: A Legal and Policy Perspective, 45 HOW. L.J. 281, 295–307 (2002) (describing the 
growth of charter schools and voucher programs and some of the lawsuits challenging voucher 
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of some charter schools against great odds, or community-based reforms 
that coordinate and connect the educational, health, and social service 
needs of children to find examples of success that have arisen from local 
reforms.
99
 The current structure of education federalism undeniably fosters 
more state and local control and accountability for state and local 
decisions than a completely federalized system of education.
100
 These 
important benefits are worth preserving. However, the inconsistency in 
reaping these benefits suggests that it is worth reexamining how education 
federalism could be restructured to more reliably secure such benefits. 
2. Education Federalism Has Served as One of Several Important 
Roadblocks to Reforms Aimed at Ensuring Equal Educational 
Opportunity 
As explained in the Introduction, in a 2013 article I analyzed how a 
preference for local control and a limited federal role in education have 
functioned as one of several critical roadblocks to three of the primary 
reforms that promote equal educational opportunity: school desegregation, 
school finance litigation in federal court, and NCLB.
101
 For instance, key 
Supreme Court decisions, from the 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley to 
the 1995 decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, relied on the structure of 
federalism and the American tradition of local control of education as one 
of the reasons for severely curtailing the authority of courts to ensure 
effective school desegregation.
102
 In so doing, these opinions clung to a 
form of dual federalism that required separate spheres for certain 
government functions, and thus insisted that education was solely a state 
 
 
programs); REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 141–43 (describing the effectiveness of Kentucky’s 
school improvement approach that includes deploying “highly skilled educators” to low-performing 
schools). 
 99. See, e.g., CHRISTINA CLARK TUTTLE ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, KIPP 
MIDDLE SCHOOLS: IMPACTS ON ACHIEVEMENT AND OTHER OUTCOMES 32 (2013) (finding in a study 
of performance in KIPP (Knowledge Is Power Program) middle schools on reading, math, science and 
social studies that “the average impacts of KIPP middle schools on student performance on state 
assessments are positive, statistically significant, and educationally meaningful in all academic 
subjects we analyzed”); Diana Hall, Schools Uniting Neighborhoods: Community Schools Anchoring 
Local Change, COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS, Summer 2012, at 14, 17 (describing outcomes of efforts to 
bring together schools and community partnerships in Multnomah County, Oregon, and finding that 
“74 percent of students met state benchmarks or growth target in Reading”). 
 100. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 607, 613 (2007). 
 101. Robinson, supra note 11, at 287, 297–307, 309–14, 323–30. The Equity and Excellence 
Commission also noted that local control of education has been a hindrance to efforts to advance 
educational equity. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 34. 
 102. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 297–304. 
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and local function.
103
 However, dual federalism had already been 
eschewed in prior Court decisions that prohibited segregated educational 
systems, and in federal legislation and enforcement that provided 
additional federal funding for low-income students and that required equal 
educational opportunity for girls, women, disabled students, and English 
language students.
104
  
Similarly, the Supreme Court relied upon education federalism as one 
of several justifications for rejecting a federal right to education in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.
105
 The Court noted that 
it lacked the expertise to interfere with state and local education judgments 
(an objection that did not stop the Court from deciding Brown) regarding 
the most effective education reforms and the connection between funding 
and educational quality.
106
 The Court’s rationale also highlighted the 
importance of local control of schools and the values it brings, such as 
tailoring programs to students’ needs and experimentation.107 The Court 
insisted that it did not want to disturb the existing balance of power 
between the federal and state governments by reaching a decision that 
essentially would result in striking down school finance systems 
throughout the United States.
108
 Thus, the Court’s decision privileged 
federalism interests over the nation’s interest in equal educational 
opportunity and insulated school finance disparities from federal judicial 
review.
109
  
Even when Congress was adopting NCLB, which represents the most 
comprehensive education statute aimed at closing achievement and 
opportunity gaps, the nation’s longstanding approach to education 
federalism insisted that states decide the standards for students and 
teachers.
110
 This “congressional genuflect to education federalism” 
resulted in many states failing to adopt rigorous standards for either 
students or teachers.
111
  
 
 
 103. Id. at 303–04. 
 104. Id. at 287, 303–04. 
 105. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43–44, 49–50 (1973); see also 
Robinson, supra note 11, at 309–11. 
 106. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42–43. 
 107. See id. at 49–50. 
 108. See id. at 47–48, 54–55. 
 109. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 310–11. 
 110. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 41 (“Long-standing political concerns and views 
of American federalism, such as the tradition of state and local control of curriculum and teaching, 
kept some options such as federally developed standards and tests off the negotiating table from the 
start.”); Robinson, supra note 11, at 325, 327–28. 
 111. Robinson, supra note 11, at 326, 328–29; cf. COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 30. 
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Certainly, education federalism does not stand alone as an obstacle to 
these reforms. Numerous other obstacles, including state and local 
backlash against court-ordered desegregation,
112
 the challenges of court-
mandated school reform,
113
 and inadequate funding for NCLB
114
 also 
undermined the effectiveness of these reforms. Nevertheless, education 
federalism was one of the central obstacles to the effectiveness of these 
reforms. 
3. Education Federalism Should Be Reexamined Because States Have 
Refused to Take the Necessary Comprehensive and Sustained 
Action That Is Needed to Ensure Equal Access to an Excellent 
Education 
Throughout this nation’s history—even acknowledging state reforms of 
education and school finance—the states have not taken sustained and 
comprehensive action to ensure that all students receive equal access to an 
excellent education.
115
 Redistributive goals and equity concerns are simply 
not consistent state priorities for education.
116
 Indeed, the 2013 report from 
the Equity and Excellence Commission found that:  
[A]ny honest assessment must acknowledge that our efforts to date 
to confront the vast gaps in educational outcomes separating 
different groups of young Americans have yet to include a serious 
and sustained commitment to ending the appalling inequities—in 
school funding, in early education, in teacher quality, in resources 
for teachers and students and in governance—that contribute so 
mightily to these gaps.
117
  
 
 
 112. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 149–74 (2007) (discussing state and local resistance and violence in response to school 
desegregation orders from federal courts). 
 113. See, e.g., BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, EQUALITY IN EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY, 
1954–2010, at 78–80, 125–26 (2013) (noting the challenge confronting school finance litigation, 
including equity litigation that struggled with “definitional problems of the concept of equality, vague 
legal requirements, the limited institutional expertise of courts in education, the continuing interplay 
between the courts and the political branch of state legislatures, and the sheer lack of knowledge about 
how to transform educational funding into educational opportunities consistently”). 
 114. See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 99–102. 
 115. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 14–15, 17–18. 
 116. See Susan H. Fuhrman, Less than Meets the Eye: Standards, Testing and Fear of Federal 
Control, in WHO’S IN CHARGE, supra note 44, at 131, 150; RYAN, supra note 3, at 153, 178. 
 117. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 14. 
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Furthermore, intrastate reforms cannot address significant and harmful 
interstate disparities in funding.
118
 
The limited scope of many reforms also reveals that the United States 
has lacked the political will and investments in enforcement to adopt and 
implement the type of reforms that would make equal access to an 
excellent education a reality.
119
 Given this generally consistent failure to 
undertake comprehensive and sustained reform, the United States should 
not expect different results from a system that has failed to ensure equal 
educational opportunity for many generations of schoolchildren.
120
 
Instead, an assessment of how education federalism could be restructured 
to support a comprehensive national effort to achieve this goal is long 
overdue.Part II.F will explain why further expansion of the role of the 
federal government as the guarantor of equal opportunity represents a 
more fruitful avenue for reform than state level reform. 
4. Education Federalism’s Insistence on State and Local Control of 
School Finance Systems Invites Inequality  
Primary state and local control over education essentially invite 
inequality in educational opportunity because of pervasive state insistence 
that local governments raise education funds and state funding formulas 
that do not effectively equalize the resulting disparities in revenue.
121
 
Although some influential victories have occurred,
122
 school finance 
litigation has mostly failed to change the basic organizational structure of 
school finance systems and their reliance on property taxes to fund 
schools.
123
 Instead, this litigation at best has obtained limited increases in 
funding for property-poor districts while allowing property-rich districts to 
 
 
 118. Liu, supra note 4, at 332–33. 
 119. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
 120. RYAN, supra note 3, at 1. 
 121. See Ryan, supra note 52, at 127–29; Osamudia R. James, Breaking Free of Chevron’s 
Constraints: Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. U.S. Department of Education, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 
147, 149 (2007). 
 122. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990) (“We find that in order 
to provide a thorough and efficient education in these poorer urban districts, the State must assure that 
their educational expenditures per pupil are substantially equivalent to those of the more affluent 
suburban districts, and that, in addition, their special disadvantages must be addressed.”); Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995) (“Children are entitled to minimally 
adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit 
children to learn. Children should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such 
as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks. Children are also entitled to minimally 
adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, 
science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas.”). 
 123. RYAN, supra note 3, at 178. 
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maintain the same funding level or to raise their funding rate at a slower 
pace.
124
  
Recent evidence of the persistent inequalities in school funding can be 
found in two distinct 2013 reports. A report from the Council on Foreign 
Relations found that in the United States more is spent per pupil in high-
income districts than in low-income districts.
125
 This stands in sharp 
contrast to most other developed nations where the reverse is true.
126
 The 
Equity and Excellence Commission report also found that “[n]o other 
developed nation has inequities nearly as deep or systemic; no other 
developed nation has, despite some efforts to the contrary, so thoroughly 
stacked the odds against so many of its children.”127 These disparities are 
due in substantial part to the continued state reliance on property taxes to 
fund schools.
128
 As a result, state school finance systems in the United 
States typically create many predominantly low-income and minority 
schools that predictably produce poor outcomes because these schools 
typically lack both the resources to ensure that their students obtain an 
effective education and the capacity to undertake effective reforms even 
when these reforms are well conceived.
129
  
The harms from persistent and pervasive disparities in educational 
opportunity are not limited to schoolchildren, their families, and their 
communities. These disparities also harm nationwide interests in a strong 
economy and a just society. The United States needs to maintain 
international academic competitiveness to attract businesses and prevent 
the loss of jobs to other more educated nations.
130
 Yet, international 
assessments reveal that the performance of U.S. students is often average 
or below average when compared to other countries,
131
 which will make it 
difficult for U.S. students to compete successfully against students from 
many other nations. The Program for International Student Assessment 
(PISA), an international assessment of performance in math, reading and 
 
 
 124. See id. at 153, 178; Black, supra note 46, at 1371; Robinson, supra note 11, at 318–21. 
 125. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 4. 
 126. Id. 
 127. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 15. 
 128. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 4. 
 129. See ACHIEVE, INC., CLOSING THE EXPECTATIONS GAP: SIXTH ANNUAL 50-STATE PROGRESS 
REPORT ON THE ALIGNMENT OF HIGH SCHOOL POLICIES WITH THE DEMANDS OF COLLEGE AND 
CAREERS 22 (2011); REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 163. 
 130. See Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education 
Enter the “Adapt or Die” Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 84 
(1995); COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 1. 
 131. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PERFORMANCE OF U.S. 15-YEAR-OLD STUDENTS IN 
MATHEMATICS, SCIENCE, AND READING LITERACY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: FIRST LOOK AT 
PISA 2012, at 9–10 (2013).  
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science, was administered in 2012 to students in sixty-five education 
systems.
132
 The results showed that the average U.S. student who 
participated scored average in reading and science literacy and below 
average in math literacy when compared to other countries in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
133
 Doctors 
Eric A. Hanushek, Paul E. Peterson and Ludger Woessman, professors of 
education at Stanford University, Harvard University and the University of 
Munich respectively, summarized the lackluster performance of U.S. 
students on international assessments in a 2013 book by noting that: 
The evidence of international comparison is now clear. American 
students lag badly and pervasively. Our students lag behind students 
not just in Asia, but in Europe and other parts of the Americas. It is 
not just disadvantaged students or a group of weak students who 
lag, but also American students from advantaged backgrounds. 
Americans are badly underrepresented among the world’s highest 
achievers.
134
  
Although some challenge such conclusions from international assessments 
as overblown and simplistic,
135
 others conclude that these less than stellar 
outcomes indicate that the U.S.education system is failing to prepare many 
of its students to compete successfully for jobs with other students from 
around the world.
136
  
Research reveals that the long-term vigor of the U.S. economy will 
depend on the advanced skills that are typically provided in higher 
education and that are needed for upper-level technical occupations.
137
 
Although the U.S. higher education system historically has been 
considered world-class, the United States is facing substantial competition 
from other countries with their fast-growing higher education systems.
138
 
 
 
 132. See id. at 1.  
 133. See id. at 9–10.  
 134. ERIC A. HANUSHEK, PAUL E. PETERSON & LUDGER WOESSMANN, ENDANGERING 
PROSPERITY: A GLOBAL VIEW OF THE AMERICAN SCHOOL vii (2013). The authors further comment, 
“While there are issues of measurement that warrant further examination and there are some apparent 
differences across subject area, the overwhelming fact of weak academic achievement among 
American youth can no longer be in dispute.” Id. 
 135. See MARTIN CARNOY & RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, WHAT DO 
INTERNATIONAL TESTS REALLY SHOW ABOUT U.S. STUDENT PERFORMANCE? 2 (2013).  
 136. See Richard A. Epstein & Jacob E. Gersen, Understanding Education in the United States: 
Its Legal and Social Implications, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 467 (2012); EQUITY & EXCELLENCE 
COMM’N, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 137. Bailey, supra note 10, at 74, 78–79. 
 138. See id. 
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As Thomas Bailey, Teachers College professor of economics and 
education, has summarized in his research:  
Occupational forecasts, analyses of job content, trends in wages, 
and changes in international competition all point to an increasing 
need in the United States for workers with high-level skills. 
Achieving increases in skill levels will be difficult as long as current 
gaps in educational attainment based on income, race, and ethnicity 
remain.
139
  
In this environment, the U.S. economy and its competitiveness will be 
increasingly hindered by low college enrollment and completion rates for 
Hispanic and African American students who increasingly will make up a 
larger share of the workforce.
140
 Many U.S. students cannot compete 
successfully with students from other developed countries, and the lower 
achievement of U.S. students could cause comparatively slow growth for 
the U.S. economy in the years to come.
141
  
The nation also has a strong interest in ensuring that entire segments of 
the American public are not foreclosed from the American dream due to 
their family income and racial and ethnic background. The principle of 
equal opportunity remains an enduring value within American society
142
 
even though that value has never been fully realized. Rather than abandon 
the interest in equal opportunity, the nation must explore how this value 
can become a reality for the nation’s schoolchildren. In Part II I propose 
some innovative ideas on how to accomplish this goal by restructuring 
education federalism. 
5. Education Federalism Should Be Guided by Research Rather than 
Primarily by Education Politics  
A reexamination of education federalism is needed because the 
expansion of the federal role in education has largely been guided by 
politics.
143
 Politics, indisputably, will continue to play an influential role in 
education reform. Nevertheless, I propose a theory for how the expanding 
federal role in education should be guided by rigorous research regarding 
 
 
 139. Id. at 92. 
 140. See id. at 92–93. 
 141. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
 142. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TRENDS IN POLITICAL VALUES AND CORE ATTITUDES: 1987–
2009, at 56 (2009) (“Nearly nine-in-ten (87%) agree that: ‘Our society should do what is necessary to 
make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.’”). 
 143. See Kaestle, supra note 41, at 17; RYAN, supra note 3, at 14.  
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the strengths of federal policymaking, just as research about the 
importance of educational opportunities for disabled students informed 
Congress’s passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975.
144
 Although federal education law and policy is also influenced by 
politics, the federal government has demonstrated a willingness to 
leverage politics and research to address the needs of the disadvantaged 
within American society when politics has prevented effective reform at 
the state and local levels.
145
 
II. A THEORY FOR DISRUPTING EDUCATION FEDERALISM 
Education federalism should be restructured to embrace greater federal 
leadership and responsibility for a national effort to provide equal access 
to an excellent education. This Part recommends the key elements for 
strengthening the federal role in education to accomplish this goal. It 
identifies new federal responsibilities that should be undertaken and 
recommends reforms of existing federal education policy that would 
facilitate this goal. Any substantial strengthening and reform of the federal 
role in education will transform the nature of education federalism because 
substantive changes to federal authority over education directly affect the 
scope of state and local authority over education. These shifts in education 
federalism have occurred throughout U.S. history, including federally 
mandated school desegregation,
146
 NCLB,
147
 and, most recently, waivers 
to NCLB.
148
  
In proposing the essential elements for a national effort to ensure equal 
access to an excellent education, I offer a broad theory to guide future 
reform by Congress, the executive branch, or both. The theory could be 
used to guide development of federal legislation, new initiatives by the 
 
 
 144. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–09 (2012)); see 
MARGRET A. WINZER, THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: FROM ISOLATION TO INTEGRATION 381 
(1993). 
 145. Charles Barone & Elizabeth DeBray, Education Policy in Congress: Perspectives from 
Inside and Out, in CARROTS, STICKS, AND THE BULLY PULPIT: LESSONS FROM A HALF-CENTURY OF 
FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 61, 63 (Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly 
eds., 2011) [hereinafter CARROTS, STICKS]. 
 146. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
493–95 (1954); see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: 
Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 
N.C. L. REV. 787, 796–837 (2010) (analyzing how some of the Supreme Court’s leading desegregation 
decisions both prohibited and implicitly tolerated school segregation). 
 147. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) 
 148. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 34, at 279–80. 
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Department of Education, or—most likely—a combination of the two. 
This theory is intentionally broad and does not propose a specific statute 
or federal initiative because a wide variety of federal statutes and 
initiatives could incorporate the elements identified here. Instead, this 
theory provides research and ideas that could inform a variety of federal 
reforms for many years to come. As Part III.B explains, I focus on future 
action by Congress and the executive branch, rather than doctrinal reform 
through the courts, because the legislative and executive branch enjoy 
numerous policymaking strengths over courts.
149
 
The following six policymaking areas identify how the federal 
government’s role in education should be expanded to ensure equal access 
to an excellent education:  
(1) Prioritizing a national goal of ensuring all children have equal 
access to an excellent education and acknowledging that achieving 
this goal will require disrupting education federalism;
150
  
(2) Incentivizing development of common opportunity-to-learn 
standards that identify the education resources that states must 
provide;
151
 
(3) Focusing rigorous research and technical assistance on the most 
effective approaches to ensuring equal access to an excellent 
education;
152
  
(4) Distributing financial assistance with the goal of closing the 
opportunity and achievement gaps;
153
  
 
 
 149. See infra Part III.B. 
 150. In arguing for a restructuring of education federalism, I join the call of other scholars who 
have recommended expanding the federal role in education and redefining the federal-state 
relationship to advance equal educational opportunity. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 
69–76 (arguing that Congress should require that all states provide a “meaningful educational 
opportunity” when it reauthorizes the Elementary and Secondary Education Act); Liu, supra note 3, at 
2049–50 (arguing that Congress should ensure “educational adequacy for equal citizenship” that, inter 
alia, reduces interstate inequalities in education). 
 151. Cf. REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 157–58 (arguing that NCLB should be revised to 
require that all children receive a “meaningful educational opportunity” and noting the “educational 
essentials” that students should receive); Liu, supra note 3, at 2103 (arguing that Congress should 
ensure “a common baseline of educational opportunity for equal citizenship”).  
 152. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 160. 
 153. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of The No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 932, 989 (2004); Paul T. Hill, The Federal Role in Education, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUC. 
POLICY, no. 3, 2000, at 11, 34; COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 160. 
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(5) Demanding continuous improvement from states to ensure equal 
access to an excellent education through federal oversight that 
utilizes a collaborative enforcement model;
154
 and 
(6) Establishing the federal government as the final guarantor of 
equal access to an excellent education
155
 by strengthening the 
relationship between federal influence and responsibility. 
As the analysis below will show, each of these elements either suggests 
how to leverage existing strengths of federal policymaking more 
effectively or fills in important gaps of federal policymaking and 
enforcement.
156
  
Federal education law and policy that encompasses these elements 
would greatly increase federal responsibility as part of a national effort to 
ensure equal access to an excellent education while setting the foundation 
for a shoulder-to-shoulder working relationship with the states to achieve 
this goal. In contrast to existing federal education policy that too often 
demands much from the states but gives them relatively little,
157
 my 
proposed theory would strengthen the relationship between increasing 
federal demands for reform and greater federal responsibility for 
accomplishing those reforms. If federal education law and policymaking 
embraced each of these elements, collectively these reforms would place 
primary responsibility on the federal government for establishing a 
national framework for ensuring equal access to an excellent education.  
A. Prioritizing a National Goal of Ensuring Equal Access to an Excellent 
Education  
The federal government must identify a national goal of ensuring that 
all children are provided equal access to an excellent education. Some 
national leaders already have noted the importance of this goal.
158
 
 
 
 154. See Robinson, supra note 37, at 1715–22. 
 155. Cf. Liu, supra note 3, at 2049 (“Congress is duty-bound to secure equal national citizenship 
by serving as the ultimate guarantor of educational opportunity.”). 
 156. See, e.g., COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 159–61 (identifying several strengths of 
federal policymaking in education). 
 157. NCLB has been criticized because, among other things, “through NCLB the federal 
government can achieve its policy goals on the proverbial financial backs of states and local school 
districts.” Heise, supra note 52, at 141. 
 158. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Speech to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce 
(Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Obama_Hispanic_Chamber 
_Commerce.html (“The relative decline of American education is untenable for our economy, it’s 
unsustainable for our democracy, it’s unacceptable for our children—and we can’t afford to let it 
continue.”). 
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However, some key points are missing from this rhetoric that must be 
emphasized to support the type of comprehensive reforms envisioned in 
this Article. For instance, the nation’s top education leaders, including the 
President, the Secretary of Education, and members of Congress, would 
need to initiate a national conversation on why the United States should no 
longer tolerate longstanding disparities in educational opportunity and 
why federal action is needed to address them.
159
  
Federal and national education leaders also must make the case that the 
entire nation would benefit from ending inequitable disparities in 
education because research reveals that reforms to help those who are 
disadvantaged typically do not succeed unless they benefit more privileged 
Americans.
160
 Therefore, the federal government must convince the more 
affluent segments of American society that a more equitable distribution 
of educational opportunity would inure to their benefit. This could be 
accomplished in part by publicizing existing research that quantifies the 
myriad of high costs that the United States pays for offering many 
schoolchildren a substandard education and that acknowledges that even 
many advantaged children are not competing effectively with their 
international peers.
161
 Initiating such a conversation also requires the 
federal government to prioritize equal access to an excellent education 
among its national policymaking agenda.  
One way that federal leaders are beginning to identify concrete ways to 
close the opportunity gap is through President Obama’s call to Congress, 
elected leaders, and business executives to make high-quality preschool 
education available for all children.
162
 This call to close one element of the 
opportunity gap builds upon robust research that reveals that investing in 
preschool education yields substantial educational, societal, and financial 
 
 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 73–87, 125–42. 
 160. See COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 35, at 9 (“Though this state of affairs rankles advocates, 
government seems unable to devise programs to help the poor unless they also offer something to 
more advantaged Americans. Absent a large and well-organized poor peoples’ movement, coalitions 
that spread benefits and unite sentiment behind programs for poor people are essential.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 161. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 81–87, 131–36 HANUSHEK, PETERSON & WOESSMANN, 
supra note 134, at vii. 
 162. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address, archived at 
http://perma.cc/48AU-4QGE (“Research shows that one of the best investments we can make in a 
child’s life is high-quality early education. Last year, I asked this Congress to help states make high-
quality pre-K available to every four year-old. As a parent as well as a President, I repeat that request 
tonight.”). 
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benefits for the United States.
163
 Although closing the prekindergarten gap 
represents an important component of closing the opportunity gap, it 
remains only one small element of this gap in the United States. A broad 
call and initiative for closing the full spectrum of the opportunity gap from 
early childhood education through high school is essential and overdue. 
Establishing equal access to an excellent education as a national 
priority would require federal leadership to explain that a reexamination of 
the nation’s approach to education federalism is warranted. Leaders would 
explain how education federalism has served as a barrier to past reforms
164
 
and the reasons that restructuring education federalism must occur if the 
United States is ever going to ensure equal access to an excellent 
education.
165
 This discussion should highlight federal willingness to 
shoulder greater responsibility for leading the national effort to achieve 
this goal while emphasizing that effective comprehensive reform must 
involve a shoulder-to-shoulder partnership among the federal, state, and 
local governments. 
Fortunately, the federal government has proven its ability to herald the 
importance of new educational goals and appropaches in the national 
interest.
166
 Research and history confirm that agenda setting serves as one 
of the strengths of the federal government in education policymaking.
167
 
For instance, President Johnson successfully convinced Congress to 
advance equal educational opportunity for low-income schoolchildren 
through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,
 168
 which includes 
Title I, and the Economic Opportunity Act,
169
 which includes programs 
like Head Start and Upward Bound.
170
 President Bush championed NCLB 
and its insistence on proficiency for all children in math and reading, 
 
 
 163. See W.S. Barnett & Leonard N. Masse, Comparative Benefit-Cost Analysis of the 
Abecedarian Program and Its Policy Implications, 26 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 113, 122 (2007); Timothy 
J. Bartik et al., Earnings Benefits of Tulsa’s Pre-K Program for Different Income Groups, 31 ECON. OF 
EDUC. REV. 1143, 1156 (2012). 
 164. See generally Robinson, supra note 11, at 287, 297–307, 309–14, 322–30. 
 165. See infra Part I.B. 
 166. See Paul T. Hill, Getting it Right the Eighth Time: Reinventing the Federal Role, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 147, 163 (Marci 
Kanstoroom & Chester E. Finn, Jr. eds., 1999); COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 159–60;  
 167. See Chester E. Finn, Jr., Agenda-Setters and Duds: A Bully Pulpit, Indeed, in CARROTS, 
STICKS, supra note 145, at 217, 217; Michael Mintrom & Sandra Vergari, Education Reform and 
Accountability Issues in an Intergovernmental Context, 27 PUBLIUS 143, 152 (1997); COLLISION 
COURSE, supra note 56, at 159–60. 
 168. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 169. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (repealed 1981). 
 170. Finn, Jr., supra note 167, at 226. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
988 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:959 
 
 
 
 
public reporting of testing data disaggregated by subgroups, and a range of 
accountability interventions for failing schools.
171
 Therefore, a federal call 
to implement a comprehensive plan to ensure equal access to an excellent 
education should build upon the lessons learned from these and other 
federal reforms. 
B. Incentivizing Development of Common Opportunity-to-Learn 
Standards 
A federal effort to ensure equal access to an excellent education should 
incentivize the states to develop common opportunity-to-learn standards. 
Opportunity-to-learn (OTL) represent one of the critical missing elements 
of the current education reform agenda. OTL standards would identify the 
in-school and out-of-school resources that students should receive in order 
to meet rigorous achievement standards.
172
 The standards in most states 
are the common core standards, which were developed by a group of 
assessment specialists and academics in response to a request from the 
Council of Chief State School Officers and the National Governors 
Association.
173
 The standards are intended to provide a clear set of math 
and English language and literacy standards for kindergarten through 
twelfth grade that would prepare all public schoolchildren to complete 
their high school education and to be ready to enroll in college or 
participate in the workforce.
174
 OTL standards are essential for ensuring 
equal access to an excellent education because, as leading education 
scholar Linda Darling-Hammond has noted, two decades of high standards 
and testing implementation has revealed that “there is plentiful evidence 
that—although standards and assessments have been useful in clarifying 
goals and focusing attention on achievement—tests alone have not 
improved schools or created educational opportunities without investments 
in curriculum, teaching, and school supports.”175 I recommend the 
 
 
 171. See id. at 227. 
 172. See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 69–74.  
 173. Elaine McArdle, What Happened to the Common Core?, HARVARD ED. MAG., Sept. 3, 2014, 
at 23. 
 174. See Common Core State Standards Initiative, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.core 
standards.org/about-the-standards/frequently-asked-questions/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y5Y9-
DQUK (last visited Feb. 20, 2015); Standards in Your State, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS 
INITIATIVE, http://www.corestandards.org/standards-in-your-state/, archived at http://perma.cc/7G6A-
MFAQ?type=live (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (identifying the forty-three states that have adopted and 
are implementing the common core standards along with the District of Columbia and four territories) 
[hereinafter Standards in Your State]. 
 175. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 19, at 74.  
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adoption of common OTL standards to provide a mechanism for ensuring 
that educational opportunities are distributed fairly so that state adoption 
of high academic standards can have the intended effect of improving 
educational outcomes.  
1. Understanding Common OTL Standards  
Common OTL standards would aim to guide state efforts to reduce 
substantial and impactful disparities in educational opportunity and set a 
floor for equal educational opportunity, while states would retain the 
flexibility to ensure greater equality of opportunity than the OTL standards 
demand. The states would serve as the primary architects of the standards 
because this approach fosters greater cooperation in implementing the 
standards and reduces criticism that the standards represent a federal 
takeover of education. As the standards are being developed, the federal 
government could publicize research regarding the essential resources that 
states must provide for students to achieve the learning benchmarks 
contained in the common core standards.  
Common OTL standards would need to be broad enough to preserve 
the ability of states to adopt a variety of educational governance, funding, 
and policymaking structures. Federal support for common OTL standards 
should encourage state-level innovation and experimentation regarding 
how each state implements the standards, thus preserving the states as 
laboratories for education reform.
176
 The standards should eschew any 
suggestion that a one-size-fits-all approach should be adopted for 
education.
177
 Moreover, decisions about how and what to teach, such as 
how best to teach English language learners and whether to teach 
creationism within a science curriculum, should remain within the purview 
of state and local control.  
Others also have called for OTL standards and some of these proposals 
provide recommendations for the content of such standards. For instance, 
the Equity and Excellence Commission recently made a somewhat similar 
proposal by calling for each state to identify and publicize “the teaching 
staff, programs and services needed to provide a meaningful educational 
opportunity to all students of every race and income level . . . based on 
 
 
 176. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF 
NATIONAL POWER 5 (2d ed. 2008); Heise, supra note 52, at 131; Pinder, supra note 33, at 2–3. 
 177. See Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: Federal 
Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 203–04 (2011). 
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evidence of effective education practices.”178 Similarly, some scholars, 
such as Michael Rebell and Jessica Wolff, have argued that the federal 
government should adopt federal OTL standards when the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act is reauthorized.
179
 The Scott Foundation has 
initiated a National Opportunity to Learn Campaign and has produced 
reports that describe the potential content of OTL standards and 
recommend the adoption of such standards.
180
 
I agree with the proposal of the National Opportunity to Learn 
Campaign for common OTL standards that would support the provision of 
equitable resources as states implement the common core standards.
181
 
However, in contrast to that proposal for mandatory federal OTL 
standards, I recommend that that the federal government provide 
incentives for states to develop these common OTL standards. As a result, 
these standards would neither be federally defined, as the National 
Opportunity to Learn Campaign and Rebell and Wolff recommend, nor 
designed individually by each state, as the Equity and Excellence 
Commission advocates. Instead, the federal government could incentivize 
creation of OTL standards by building upon its success in incentivizing the 
development of the common core standards through RTTT.
182
  
In addition, a federal effort to support adoption of national OTL 
standards would move beyond the Commission’s recommendation in two 
important ways. First, if the states agree to identify the resources that are 
needed to offer a meaningful educational opportunity, they run the risk of 
being sued under state constitutions for failing to provide these 
resources.
183
 Given this likelihood, federal support for development of 
common OTL standards must act as a check against state incentives to set 
a low floor for educational opportunity.
184
 Federal support for these 
standards would emphasize the importance of excellence in education and 
 
 
 178. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 18. The report also recommends that 
states assess and publish the costs of these resources based upon “the efficient and cost-effective use of 
resources.” Id. 
 179. REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 157. For a thorough analysis of the potential content of 
such standards, see id. at 157–64. 
 180. See generally LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW ET AL., FRAMEWORK 
FOR PROVIDING ALL STUDENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN THROUGH REAUTHORIZATION OF THE 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 3 (2010); NAT’L OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN 
CAMPAIGN, FEDERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 8–10 (2009). 
 181. See LAWYER’S COMMITTEE, supra note 180, at 2. 
 182. See McGuinn, supra note 26, at 143–45. 
 183. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 429, 442–43 (N.J. 1997) (holding the 
New Jersey funding formula unconstitutional because it failed to link school funding to what students 
must receive to learn the content in state standards).  
 184. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 160. 
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the need to empower U.S. students to compete successfully with their 
counterparts around the world. In contrast, states sometimes maintain a 
statewide or regional aim for education and lose sight of the reality that 
students now compete in an international job market. Second, my theory 
would draw upon the insights of states in defining essential educational 
resources, but would not make each state the sole judge of its own 
standards, as the Commission report would permit. Instead, the states 
would have to reach agreement on common standards, which inevitably 
would involve a compromise on what should be included.  
Common OTL standards would identify not only what educational 
resources should be offered but also establish some standards for the 
quality of the resources needed to effectively implement rigorous 
standards. For instance, common OTL standards could identify the 
essential elements of high-quality prekindergarten education, especially 
given President Obama’s recent focus on this issue.185 The meaning of the 
phrase “high-quality” can differ greatly among the states and 
prekindergarten providers; thus some common baseline for an 
understanding of “high-quality” should be established in common OTL 
standards.  
Common OTL standards also might establish the necessary access to 
effective teachers, educational materials, and support services. The 
analysis by Michael Rebell and Jessica Wolff provides helpful examples 
of some of the elements that the standards should include. For instance, 
they recommend that students should receive “effective teachers, 
principals, and other personnel,” “adequate school facilities,” and 
“instrumentalities of learning, including, but not limited to, up-to-date 
textbooks, libraries, laboratories, and computers” among other essential 
resources.
186
 Given the wide range of resources that could be included in a 
common OTL standard, a thorough discussion of their essential content is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
Ultimately, federal incentives for states to develop common OTL 
standards would build upon past federal successes in addressing denials of 
equal educational opportunity.
187
 Once these standards are developed, 
states must undertake efforts to ensure that students are delivered an 
 
 
 185. Press Release, Fact Sheet: White House Office of Press Sec’y, President Obama’s Plan for 
Early Education for All Americans (Feb. 13, 2013) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/ 
02/13/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-plan-early-education-all-americans), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
RH8D-V6YW (identifying how the White House defines a “high-quality” preschool program). 
 186. REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 157.  
 187. See Barone & DeBray, supra note 145, at 63.  
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education consistent with the standards. Certainly, the standards initially 
will be aspirational. Yet, reaching this reality first requires identifying the 
standards as clear goals and then developing a step-by-step plan to 
implement them. Such a plan would include examining the gap between 
existing resources and the standards, determining the cost of bridging the 
gap, and raising funds for closing the gap. As discussed below in Part II.C, 
federal research, technical expertise, and financial assistance should be 
offered to expand the capacity of states to bridge the gap between existing 
resources and the common national OTL standards.  
2. Shepherding a Successful Effort for Developing Common OTL 
Standards 
In its inception, the standards and accountability movement recognized 
that the success of academic standards depended upon ensuring that 
students receive an equal opportunity to acquire the knowledge within 
high standards.
188
 OTL standards were tested, but proved politically 
unsustainable, in the mid-1990s.
189
 In 1994, Congress passed Goals 2000: 
Educate America Act and this law provided for two options for the 
creation of OTL standards that established the conditions and resources 
needed throughout the education system to provide students the 
opportunity to learn the content set forth in voluntary national or state 
content standards.
190
 First, the National Education Standards and 
Improvement Council was created to develop voluntary OTL standards.
191
 
Second, states were permitted to develop their own OTL standards.
192
 The 
Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 (IASA) also conditioned Title I 
funds on state development of rigorous content and performance 
standards.
193
 IASA included a requirement that state plans must describe 
how states will help districts and schools “develop the capacity” to achieve 
high standards and that this plan could include OTL standards.
194
  
 
 
 188. See id. at 73–74 .  
 189. See MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 109. 
 190. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, § 3(a)(7), 108 Stat. 125 (1994) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 52–
53. 
 191. Goals 2000: Educate America Act §§ 212, 213(c); REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 52–53. 
 192. Goals 2000: Educate America Act § 213(d); REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 52–53. 
 193. Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 1111(b)(8), 108 Stat. 
3518, 3523 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 96 
tbl. 5.1.  
 194. See id.  
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These provisions were enacted because of the recognition that students 
could not be expected to achieve high standards without an equal 
opportunity to learn the content within the standards.
195
 However, shortly 
after the passage of these laws, a Republican-controlled Congress repealed 
the federal power to establish OTL standards and the mandate that states 
should establish such standards.
196
 
In contrast to the past effort, my recommendation of common OTL 
standards comes at a time in U.S. history that is ripe for federal support for 
such standards. When OTL standards were first considered, vigorous 
debates were ongoing about the content and implementation of academic 
standards and the appropriate federal role regarding those standards.
197
 
Today, although some opposition to the common core standards has arisen 
regarding concerns such as the pace of implementation and federal 
involvement in these standards,
198
 all states have adopted academic 
standards and the states are far closer to adopting common academic 
standards than ever before.
199
 These common academic standards will 
provide a consistent aim for education across states. This process will lay a 
foundation for the states to identify what they need to provide to students 
to meet these standards. This common endeavor, along with growing 
federal support and influence in education, should provide a more fertile 
ground for federal incentives to create common OTL standards.  
In addition, state leadership could draw upon the lessons from school 
finance litigation that attempts to define the educational opportunities that 
students must receive to meet state constitutional obligations for 
education.
200
 This rich source of research was not available when OTL 
standards were first introduced through federal legislation.
201
 Although 
obtaining federal support for these standards will likely involve a tough 
political battle, the battle today would begin with greater ammunition and 
more favorable conditions. 
 
 
 195. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 19, at 73–74.  
 196. MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 109; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 68. 
 197. See MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 86. 
 198. See Javier C. Hernández, Responding to Critics, New York State Plans to Scale Back 
Standardized Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2013, at A16; Valerie Strauss, Slow Down Reforms, Say 
School Chiefs in Maryland, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2014, at B1; Emma Brown, Gov. Jindal Attacks 
Common Core, WASH. POST, FEB. 6, 2015, AT A3. 
 199. RYAN, supra note 3, at 244 (noting that all states have implemented standards and tests 
linked to these standards); Standards in Your State, supra note 174 (identifying the forty-three states 
that have adopted and are implementing the common core standards).  
 200. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) 
(identifying seven capacities that the state must provide each child to secure the child’s fundamental 
right to an adequate education). 
 201. See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 68. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I do not recommend federally 
defined standards, as Goals 2000 envisioned and as some scholars have 
recommended.
202
 Instead, I recommend federal support for a state effort to 
develop national common OTL standards. Through state leadership and 
consensus building, my recommendations could avoid some of the 
opposition encountered by the prior attempt at OTL standards.  
C. Focusing Rigorous Federal Research and Technical Assistance on the 
Most Effective Approaches for States to Provide Equal Access to an 
Excellent Education 
For the federal government to lead a comprehensive national effort to 
ensure equal access to an excellent education, the federal government must 
provide generous support for the rigorous, objective research and effective 
technical assistance state and local governments will need to reach this 
goal. Substantial variations exist in the educational, economic, and 
administrative capabilities of states.
203
 One of the principal hindrances to 
NCLB’s success was insufficient capacity at the state and local level to 
implement the required changes.
204
 Comprehensive reforms to ensure 
equal access to an excellent education will demand even more from states 
than NCLB. Therefore, federally supported research and technical 
assistance must help state and local governments develop the capacity to 
implement effective reforms.
205
  
Fortunately, Congress already has begun to recognize the need for 
rigorous educational research through its passage of the Education 
Sciences Reform Act (ESRA).
206
 Congress passed ESRA in 2002 to 
provide research that would assist the states in complying with NCLB.
 207
 
ESRA created the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) and authorized 
IES to engage only in research based on science.
208
 This congressional 
requirement represents a substantial shift in how the federal government is 
 
 
 202. See id. at 157. 
 203. See COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 35, at 14.  
 204. See David K. Cohen & Susan L. Moffitt, The Influence of Practice on Policy, in SHAPING 
EDUCATION POLICY: POWER AND PROCESS 63, 77–78 (Douglas E. Mitchell et al. eds., 2011); 
COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 49–52.  
 205. NANCY KOBER ET AL., CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, BETTER FEDERAL POLICIES LEADING TO 
BETTER SCHOOLS 8 (2010); Fuhrman, supra note 116, at 151. 
 206. Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-279, 116 Stat. 1940 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 207. Benjamin Michael Superfine, New Directions in School Funding and Governance: Moving 
from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY. L.J. 653, 686 (2009–10).  
 208. 20 U.S.C. § 9511(a) (2012); Superfine, supra note 207, at 686–87. 
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conducting and funding education research.
209
 This change has been noted 
as a promising development in congressional support for education 
research and some believe that IES has helped emphasize evidence-based 
approaches for education research that could focus attention on reforms 
that could be replicated.
210
 The passage of ESRA indicates that Congress 
recognizes the need for federal support for high-quality education research 
to enable the United States to reach its essential educational goals. 
Rigorous, objective research that supports a national effort to ensure 
equal access to an excellent education should build on this success while 
also establishing an agenda that identifies the critical research states need 
as they enact reforms to achieve this goal. This research would examine 
the most cost-effective and efficient state funding methods that ensure 
equal access to an excellent education.
211
 It also could propose and test 
funding models that states have not yet adopted. In addition, federal 
research could assess school governance and funding models from other 
countries that provide a more equitable distribution of educational 
resources. 
Additionally, federally supported research could help identify and 
disseminate research regarding the essential characteristics of high-quality 
educational offerings. For example, scientifically based research on such 
topics as the essential characteristics of a high-quality prekindergarten 
program should serve as the foundation for identifying how to close 
opportunity gaps in prekindergarten education.
212
 Harvard scholar 
Hirokazu Yoshikawa has found that these characteristics include involving 
children in planning activities and creating low student-teacher ratios.
213
 In 
 
 
 209. Superfine, supra note 207, at 686. 
 210. See id. at 689. In addition, the U.S. Department of Education’s newly developed What Works 
Clearinghouse has disseminated some research on promising educational practices. See Paul Manna, 
Strong Federal Policies Benefit Local Districts, 90 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 568, 570 (2009). 
 211. Cf. Adler, supra note 177, at 205 (discussing the benefits of federal health research and 
commenting that “information about the cost-effectiveness of given types of health interventions or the 
likely market effects of certain types of policies are likely to apply across jurisdictions”). 
 212. See Fact Sheet, supra note 185; see also, e.g., Ellen C. Frede, The Role of Program Quality 
in Producing Early Childhood Program Benefits, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Winter 1995, at 115, 120 
(“The longitudinal research supports the view that small class sizes and low child-to-teacher ratios 
contribute to positive, long-term benefits for children from low-income families.”); Nat’l Inst. of Child 
Health & Human Dev. Early Child Care Research Network & Greg J. Duncan, Modeling the Impacts 
of Child Care Quality on Children’s Preschool Cognitive Development, 74 CHILD DEV. 1454, 1456 
(2003) (“Findings from the National Child Care Staffing Study, the Cost, Quality, and Outcomes 
Study, . . . as well as the NICHD Study of Early Child Care show that children attending programs in 
which caregivers had more education and training, and in which child-staff ratios were smaller, 
performed better across a range of cognitive and social measures.”) (citations omitted). 
 213. Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Long-Term Effects of Early Childhood Programs on Social Outcomes 
and Delinquency, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Winter 1995, at 51, 68 (finding that effective early childhood 
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addition, the federal government should ensure that existing rigorous 
research on this topic is disseminated to states so that states can avoid 
costly duplication of research as they develop new programs. 
A federal research agenda also should identify the primary 
impediments to ensuring equal access to an excellent education. For 
instance, research indicates that challenging work environments in urban 
schools discourage highly qualified teachers from teaching in such 
schools.
214
 Once common impediments are identified, research should 
examine the costs and benefits of potential reforms to address these 
impediments. The federal government could assist states and localities as 
they undertake and support research that responds to regional, state, and 
local conditions that present unique challenges.
215
  
Establishing a federal research agenda to ensure equal access to an 
excellent education would capitalize on the federal government’s 
substantial comparative advantage over states and localities in conducting 
and supporting research.
216
 It would eliminate the inefficiencies caused by 
each state conducting its own research. This research also would reduce 
the cost of state efforts to achieve this goal by offering research that 
supplies the possible reforms for achieving this goal.
217
 Once this research 
is disseminated, it would provide state and local governments sufficient 
models to consider as they develop state- and district-specific plans of 
action. 
In addition to research assistance, the federal government should offer 
technical assistance that supports state efforts to ensure equal access to an 
excellent education. This component would strengthen the existing 
federal-state relationship because the federal government offers technical 
assistance on a wide variety of issues, including assistance on how to 
achieve the core goals of RTTT,
218
 early childhood education,
219
 and 
 
 
programs “emphasized the initiation and planning of activities by the child rather than the teacher” and 
“staff-child ratios in infant/toddler educational child care were in the range of one adult to three or four 
children, and 1 to 6 in preschool programs”). 
 214. See RYAN, supra note 3, at 173.  
 215. See McGovern, supra note 72, at 1521. The federal government also could encourage state 
innovation in developing new funding mechanisms through a variety of efforts, including federal 
research grants and evaluations, funding to outside experts, and intergovernmental partnerships. See 
Hill, supra note 166, at 175; KOBER ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; Manna, supra note 210, at 570. 
 216. See DAVID T. CONLEY, WHO GOVERNS OUR SCHOOLS? CHANGING ROLES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 32 (2003); Marshall S. Smith, Rethinking ESEA: A Zero-Base Reauthorization, in 
CARROTS, STICKS, supra 145, at 231, 233; Fuhrman, supra note 116, at 151; COLLISION COURSE, 
supra note 56, at 160. 
 217. See Adler, supra note 177, at 216, 218. 
 218. See U.S. Dep’t. of Educ., Race to the Top Resources, http://www2.ed.gov/about/inits/ed/ 
implementation-support-unit/tech-assist/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
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special education.
220
 To achieve this goal, the states may need federal 
technical assistance on the most effective and efficient funding 
mechanisms and other reforms and the common barriers to successful 
reforms. In addition, state and local governments may need federal 
technical assistance regarding how to develop data collection systems that 
enable states and localities to document the scope of opportunity gaps and 
the effectiveness of efforts to reduce those gaps. Although NCLB provided 
a strong impetus for states to develop new data systems in order to comply 
with the law’s standards for teacher quality, this issue received less 
attention from states once it became clear that those requirements would 
not consistently be enforced.
221
 Federal technical assistance should help 
preclude any unnecessary diversion of resources and duplication of effort 
that would occur if each state had to develop such technical expertise on 
its own.
222
 
Additional federal technical assistance is essential to supplement the 
limited capacity of some state education agencies to implement 
comprehensive reform.
223
 As education scholar Paul Manna insightfully 
noted in his comprehensive analysis of NCLB implementation:  
[D]espite being charged with implementing education policy in a 
state, these agencies have tended to possess little expertise in 
actually working on substantively important education initiatives, 
such as the development of standards, curriculum, and tests. Instead, 
their main purpose has been to distribute state and federal money to 
local communities and then monitor to ensure that those dollars 
have been spent appropriately.
224
  
Although the capacity and expertise of state education agencies has grown 
as they have implemented NCLB, these agencies, along with state 
legislatures, may still lack the capacity and expertise to implement a 
comprehensive reform agenda to ensure equal access to an excellent 
education. The federal government could address this capacity gap by 
providing essential expertise on effective reforms as its understanding of 
these issues deepens through the implementation of the research agenda.  
 
 
 219. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Federal Technical Assistance for Early Learning, http://www.ed. 
gov/early-learning/federal-technical-assistance (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
 220. See Special Education—National Activities—Technical Assistance and Dissemination, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/oseptad/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
 221. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 55–58. 
 222. See Adler, supra note 177, at 205–06. 
 223. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 49.  
 224. Id. 
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D. Distributing Financial Assistance Focused on Closing Opportunity and 
Achievement Gaps 
The federal government will need to provide financial assistance to 
states to support a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent 
education due to the substantial cost of closing opportunity and 
achievement gaps.
225
 This financial support for education would leverage 
the federal government’s superior ability to redistribute resources among 
the states.
226
 This superior ability stems in part from the federal 
government’s capacity to spread the costs of redistribution across a wider 
national constituency than state governments. In addition, business 
interests and the wealthy possess a greater ability to thwart redistribution 
at the state level than at the federal level because they can threaten to leave 
a state.
227
 Past experience reveals that federal resources can be an effective 
means for influencing state and local education policy.
228
  
The federal financial contribution should include both incentives and 
assistance to address opportunity and achievement gaps. Financial 
incentives will draw attention to this critical issue and motivate states that 
have resisted reform, just as incentives motivated reform through RTTT.
229
 
Financial assistance also will expand the potential reform options beyond 
what states could implement with their own state resources and will supply 
political cover for politicians who support reform.
230
 The federal 
investment in efforts to ensure equal access to an excellent education 
could include funding mechanisms such as competitive grants and formula 
grants.  
Federal financial support for closing opportunity and achievement gaps 
will be essential for expanding state capacity to achieve this goal. A recent 
 
 
 225. See, e.g., Obama, supra note 162 (noting the need for federal aid to support state 
development of high-quality prekindergarten education). 
 226. See Kevin G. Welner & Jeannie Oakes, Mandates Still Matter: Examining a Key Policy Tool 
for Promoting Successful Equity-Minded Reform, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK, supra note 17, at 77, 89; 
Gittell, supra note 75, at 39; COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 160; Ryan, supra note 153, at 989. 
 227. See Kleven, supra note 14, at 401. 
 228. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 160 (noting the importance of federal grants to 
incentivize desegregation and to provide flexibility to state and local governments); KOBER ET AL., 
supra note 205, at 5 (“Over the past several decades, the federal government has made important, 
positive contributions to education by setting broad goals, redistributing resources to redress 
inequities, mobilizing state and local governments to address pressing needs, and calling attention to 
urgent national priorities and promising practices.”). 
 229. See Friedman & Solow, supra note 27, at 146; McGuinn, supra note 26, at 143–47. 
 230. See Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Educational Federalism: 
President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 542 (2011); 
COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 35, at 111; COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 95. 
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move in this direction can be found in President Obama’s proposal to 
invest $75 billion in federal funds over ten years to ensure that all four-
year-olds receive a high-quality prekindergarten education.
231
 In addition, 
President Obama previously created incentives for states to invest in early 
childhood education through the RTTT Early Learning Challenge by 
offering states the chance to compete for $500 million in discretionary 
grants if they expanded early childhood education to young children of 
low-income families.
232
 Such efforts represent an important first step 
toward closing the substantial opportunity and achievement gaps. 
However, a comprehensive effort to ensure equal access to an excellent 
education would need to invest federal resources across the full spectrum 
of opportunity and achievement gaps in elementary and secondary 
education.  
Federal support for a national effort to ensure equal access to an 
excellent education would not require federal funding for all of the 
necessary state and local reforms. Instead, the federal government should 
generously increase its contribution to education costs while continuing to 
share these costs with the state governments. The level of generosity of 
federal funding should be based upon the disparate capacities of states to 
close opportunity and achievement gaps.
233
 Generous federal financial 
assistance would fund a larger percentage of the costs of reforms than had 
occurred with past education reforms.
234
 These past reforms typically 
failed to deliver the substantial funds that were initially anticipated when 
the laws were enacted.
235
 For example, one of many criticisms of NCLB 
was that the federal government covered very little of the implementation 
costs.
236
 Since increasing federal funding for ensuring equal access to an 
excellent education would simultaneously increase federal responsibility 
for achieving this goal, my theory would create a closer and more effective 
marriage between federal demands and federal responsibility as discussed 
below further in Part II.F.
237
  
 
 
 231. H. BUDGET COMM. DEMOCRATIC STAFF, H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET 10 (2013). 
 232. Applications for New Awards; Race to the Top—Early Learning Challenge, 78 Fed. Reg. 
53,992, 53,992 (Aug. 30, 2013).  
 233. Liu, supra note 3, at 2114. 
 234. Given this Article’s focus on identifying the essential elements for a national effort to ensure 
equal access to an excellent opportunity rather than proposing a specific statute or program, it does not 
offer a specific dollar amount for the appropriate federal financial investment. 
 235. See JACK JENNINGS, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, REFLECTIONS ON A HALF-CENTURY OF SCHOOL 
REFORM: WHY HAVE WE FALLEN SHORT AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 3 (2012). 
 236. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 62; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 100. 
 237. Although some, such as education scholar Michael Heise, have suggested that federal 
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Additionally, a blend of federal and state funding will encourage 
greater efficiency than full federal funding.
238
 Shared funding should 
encourage both the federal and state governments to contain costs. If the 
federal government paid the full bill for any necessary reforms, the states 
might inflate the alleged costs of such reforms. Shared financial 
responsibility helps avoid such perverse incentives.  
E.  Demanding Continuous Improvement from States on Ensuring Equal 
Access to an Excellent Education Through Federal Oversight that 
Utilizes a Collaborative Enforcement Model 
A federally-led effort to ensure equal access to an excellent education 
should include federal monitoring of state progress. Such monitoring 
would provide federal accountability for state progress, thus helping to 
foster improvement.
239
 Oversight also would enable the federal 
 
 
involvement in education should be limited to what it funds, this Article’s proposed theory disagrees 
with that contention for three reasons. See Heise, supra note 52, at 149–50, 153; see also South Dakota 
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the federal government 
should pay for what it seeks to accomplish through the Spending Clause). First, this approach would 
greatly curtail federal involvement in education because the federal government does not enjoy a 
limitless financial capacity to fund education given its competing policymaking priorities. The 
reduction of the federal government’s involvement in education would be a tremendous loss to the 
nation because its role in education has served as an essential impetus for the nation’s efforts to ensure 
equal educational opportunity. See GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & ERICA FRANKENBERG, CIVIL 
RIGHTS PROJECT, SOUTHERN SLIPPAGE: GROWING SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN THE MOST 
DESEGREGATED REGION OF THE COUNTRY 7–8 (2012); JENNINGS, supra note 235, at 2. If the federal 
government had been limited to what it could pay for when it passed Title IX or the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act, this legislation probably would not have been adopted or would have been 
greatly limited. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012)); Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–09 (2012)). 
Second, shared federal and state funding for education encourages greater investment in education 
because the federal government can encourage additional state investment in education by raising the 
federal funding matching rate. In addition, states can purchase services less expensively because the 
federal government would cover a portion of the costs. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). David Super offers some criticisms of federal matching programs and offers some 
suggestions for improvement. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2544, 2587–88, 2649–50 (2005). Finally, requiring that states contribute to the reforms that will be 
required will encourage state commitment to the success of those reforms. For these reasons, although 
this Article recommends that the federal government should bear primary responsibility for 
establishing a theory that will guide a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent education, 
this Article supports shared federal and state financial responsibility for achieving this goal. 
 238. See Mun Tsang & Henry M. Levin, The Impact of Intergovernmental Grants on Educational 
Expenditure, 53 REV. OF EDUC. RESEARCH 329, 334–35 (1983). 
 239. See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, Why the Federal Government Should Be Involved in School 
Accountability, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 167, 171 (2005) (“[W]hile accountability as written 
into federal law with NCLB can be improved, the existing system offers considerable real 
improvement over the stagnant schools of the past decades.”). 
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government to identify states’ needs for research, technical and financial 
assistance when the states fail to seek it. Effective federal monitoring and 
oversight of a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent 
education is also one of the missing components of the current education 
reform agenda.  
This federal monitoring should focus on a collaborative enforcement 
approach to resolve any disputes between the federal and state 
governments regarding how states achieve this goal. In a 2007 article, I 
proposed a collaborative enforcement model for a federal right to 
education and I envision this Article’s theory adopting a similar model.240 
Under this collaborative approach, the federal government would establish 
a periodic, reporting obligation on state efforts to ensure equal access to an 
excellent education.
241
 State reporting would describe progress on 
achieving this goal, identify any impediments to progress, and offer 
potential plans for reform. Input also would be sought from education 
reform organizations, civil rights groups, and citizens so that the federal 
government would have a full picture of state efforts.
242
 A panel or 
commission of experts would review this information.
243
 
Upon receiving this information, the panel or commission would assess 
state reforms and provide feedback on how states could improve their 
efforts.
244
 The panel or commission would not have authority to insist 
upon implementation of these recommendations and instead would 
encourage states to develop their own approaches.
245
 Federal 
recommendations would merely serve as a research-based source of ideas 
for state reform. The federal government also would assist states in 
identifying hindrances to effective reforms and provide research and 
technical assistance based on successful reforms in other states.
246
 This 
federal monitoring would draw upon the superior federal capability for 
enforcement of equity requirements.
247
  
 
 
 240. Robinson, supra note 37, at 1715–22. 
 241. Id. at 1716–18. 
 242. Id. at 1717–18. 
 243. Id. at 1718. 
 244. Id. at 1717–18; see Fuhrman, supra note 116, at 151 (“Washington’s ability to fund and draw 
on research that crosses state boundaries, to invest additional support in capacity-building functions 
such as professional development, and to hold up a mirror to state efforts through evaluation studies, 
NAEP, and cross-national assessments can provide important support for state reforms.”). 
 245. See Robinson, supra note 37, at 1718–19.  
 246. See Manna, supra note 210, at 571 (“Their distance from the ground level gives federal 
leaders a fantastic bird’s-eye view of the system, which can help them find important leverage points 
to promote reforms.”). 
 247. See Black, supra note 46, at 1350–51. But see Barone & DeBray, supra note 145, at 71 (“On 
things that follow along clear, bright lines—like funding formulas, requirements to set goals and 
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In addition, the collaborative enforcement approach would view 
penalties as an undesirable last resort, particularly given the additional 
leverage that National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 
may provide states to challenge implementation of federal programs, 
which is discussed below.
248
 Instead, it would embrace flexibility in 
negotiating compliance with federal funding conditions when warranted 
by unique state and local conditions.
249
 A collaborative enforcement model 
also would require the U.S. Department of Education to develop systems 
to ensure consistency in federal oversight so that the inconsistent 
enforcement that undermined NCLB’s implementation, and prior 
authorizations of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, is not 
repeated.
250
  
F. Establishing the Federal Government as the Final Guarantor of Equal 
Access to an Excellent Education by Strengthening the Relationship 
Between Federal Influence and Responsibility 
By enacting federal legislation and initiatives that embrace each of the 
elements discussed above, the federal government would reestablish itself 
as the final guarantor of equal access to an excellent education.
251 
Historically, equal educational opportunity served as one of the principle 
rationales for federal involvement in education.
252
 The federal government 
has played a critical role in assisting vulnerable groups when the states 
have failed to act in the national interest.
253
 Yet, an increasing focus on 
 
 
disaggregate data by subgroups, or targeted investments in pilot programs—Congress is generally able 
to achieve its aims, or at least monitor its success in doing so. But on more nuanced policies, or ones 
that require fairly focused monitoring of actions by states and school districts, it falls far short again 
and again.”).  
 248. See Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 114 (2012); 
Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 865, 908. 
 249. See PAUL MANNA, SCHOOL’S IN: FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL EDUCATION AGENDA 
111 (2006) [hereinafter SCHOOL’S IN] (“Due to its own weaknesses in license and capacity relative to 
state policymakers, federal officials often reason that if they did sanction or punish states, it is unlikely 
these actions would produce the ultimate results they desire. It might also prevent these federal policy 
entrepreneurs from developing their education agendas in the future.”). 
 250. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 66. 
 251. See CONLEY, supra note 216, at 32 (“The federal government remains the level of 
governance most concerned with equity issues. This is appropriate historically and also provides the 
strongest legitimacy for a broad federal role.”). 
 252. See Erik W. Robelen, The Evolving Federal Role, in LESSONS OF A CENTURY: A NATION’S 
SCHOOLS COME OF AGE 240, 240 (2000); Kaestle, supra note 41, at 27. 
 253. Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly, Reflections on the Federal Role: A Half-Century of 
Hard-Won Lessons, in CARROTS, STICKS, supra note 145, at 273, 273, 275–76; CTR. ON EDUC. 
POLICY, supra note 44, at 4. 
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standards and accountability shifted federal attention away from issues of 
educational equity, while federal reforms unsuccessfully attempted to 
ensure a quality education for all schoolchildren.
254
 Although the federal 
government consistently should aim to maintain excellence, it also needs 
to reassert itself as the final guarantor of equal educational opportunity 
because the current failure of the federal government to fulfill this role is 
one of the critical missing elements of the education reform agenda. In 
making this recommendation, I join with other scholars, such as Michael 
Rebell and now-California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu, whose 
proposals call upon the federal government to guarantee some form of 
equal educational opportunity.
255
  
History suggests that the federal government is likely to be the only 
level of government to engage in the leadership and substantial 
redistribution of resources that equal access to an excellent education will 
require.
256
 Local politics oftentimes hinders substantial efforts to 
redistribute resources.
257
 Thus, it is unsurprising that it took federal 
legislation to initiate numerous past reform efforts that addressed 
disparities in educational opportunity, such as those that assist 
disadvantaged students,
258
 girls and women,
259
 and disabled children.
260
 
The federal government possesses an unparalleled ability to mobilize 
national, state, and local reform when the United States confronts an 
educational crisis.
261
 Therefore, my call for a stronger federal role in 
education would build upon the historical federal role in advancing 
educational equity and the superior ability of the federal government to 
accomplish a redistribution of educational opportunity.  
By focusing its attention on the policymaking areas identified in Parts 
II.A through E above, the federal government would shoulder the primary 
 
 
 254. Petrovich, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
 255. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 9, 69–74 (arguing that all children should be 
provided a meaningful educational opportunity and identifying its components); Liu, supra note 3, at 
2049 (arguing that Congress should ensure “educational adequacy for equal citizenship”) (italics 
omitted). 
 256. Gittell, supra note 75, at 39. 
 257. See Kirst, supra note 44, at 15–16. Kirst argues that both federal and state governments 
operate more effectively in school finance and civil rights arenas due to the roadblocks to 
redistribution at the local level. Id. at 16. 
 258. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 259. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012)).  
 260.  Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–09 (2012)). 
 261. See Robinson, supra note 75, at 457.  
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burden for a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent 
education. This primary federal burden would be carried through a 
multifaceted approach in which each policymaking area would support 
and reinforce the others and draw upon federal strengths in education 
policymaking. At the same time, federal leadership would incentivize the 
states to engage in a collaborative partnership with the federal government 
to achieve this goal. States would retain substantial control over education 
as they choose among a wide array of reforms while facing compelling 
incentives to join in this national effort.  
Some may argue that the states should bear the primary burden for 
ensuring equal access to an excellent education because education remains 
primarily a state function. I reject this dualist understanding of 
education
262
 while highlighting our longstanding history that reveals that 
the states will not rectify opportunity and achievement gaps on their own. 
The federal role in education has grown significantly in recent decades and 
has become increasingly influential.
263
 My proposed theory builds upon 
the growing consensus reflected in NCLB and other federal education 
legislation that the federal government should exercise a substantial role in 
education law and policy.
264
  
Others may contend that the United States should rein in the growing 
federal role in education. In some ways, this criticism points to the failures 
of past federal initiatives as evidence that the federal government’s role in 
education should be curtailed. Most recently, some scholars condemn the 
shortcomings and implementation of NCLB and RTTT.
265
 Undeniably, the 
federal government has undertaken a variety of unsuccessful education 
reforms.
266
 Yet, an established track record in education over the last fifty 
years has given us ample evidence to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of federal education policymaking. My theory intentionally 
builds upon identified federal strengths in innovative and progressive 
ways. In particular, the theory builds on the foundational premise that in 
the face of inconsistent and overwhelmingly ineffective state reform, the 
 
 
 262. See Joseph F. Zimmerman, National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the 
Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS 15, 15, 19 (2001). 
 263. MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 1. 
 264. Id.  
 265. See, e.g., Maurice R. Dyson, Are We Really Racing to the Top or Leaving Behind the 
Bottom? Challenging Conventional Wisdom and Dismantling Institutional Repression, 40 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 181, 238–43 (2012); Monica Teixeira de Sousa, A Race to the Bottom? President 
Obama’s Incomplete and Conservative Strategy for Reforming Education in Struggling Schools or the 
Perils of Ignoring Poverty, 39 STETSON L. REV. 629, 630–31 (2010); MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 
183–87; RYAN, supra note 3, at 244–45. 
 266. See Finn, Jr., supra note 167, at 219–26. 
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federal government enjoys a superior and more consistent reform record 
on issues of educational equity.
267
 Education scholars Charles Barone and 
Elizabeth DeBray confirmed this superior track record in stating that: 
Over the past half century, Congress has most frequently sought, 
and in most cases successfully enacted, sweeping changes to federal 
law when (1) a segment of U.S. Society was judged as having been 
denied equal educational opportunity and (2) states and 
municipalities were unable or unwilling to remedy those inequities. 
In education, as in other areas, like voting rights or retirement 
security for seniors, this has unquestionably been its most important 
and powerful role.
268
 
My theory builds upon this superior record in proposing a theory for 
disrupting education federalism that can guide the United States toward 
equal access to an excellent education. 
In making the federal government the final guarantor of equal access to 
an excellent education, my proposed theory would strengthen the 
relationship between growing federal influence in education and greater 
federal responsibility for accomplishing national objectives. This 
transformation would greatly improve upon the nation’s current 
cooperative federalism framework for education.
269
 Today, although the 
federal government invests in education, this investment is quite limited 
relative to state and local investments.
270
 By increasing its demands while 
limiting its contributions, the federal government has been able to avoid 
shouldering a substantial portion of the costs and burdens associated with 
accomplishing the nation’s education goals while still enjoying the ability 
to set the nation’s education agenda and demand results.271 In contrast, my 
proposal would establish a much closer and more effective marriage 
between federal influence and responsibility.  
 
 
 267. See Hess & Kelly, supra note 253, at 275–76; JENNINGS, supra note 235, at 2–3. 
 268. Barone & DeBray, supra note 145, at 63. 
 269. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 434 (1998). 
 270. See SCHOOL’S IN, supra note 249, at 111–12; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 
47, at 2, 4 tbl.1. 
 271. See Heise, supra note 52, at 141; Robinson, supra note 75, at 462–64 (reviewing RYAN, 
supra note 3). 
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III. THE BALANCE SHEET FOR DISRUPTING EDUCATION FEDERALISM  
In response to my theory for strengthening the federal role in education 
to establish the foundation for a national effort to ensure equal access to an 
excellent education, critics may raise a variety of objections. Some may 
contend that Congress could not pass legislation that builds on my theory 
because it could violate the Spending Clause requirements that were 
strengthened in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 
(NFIB),
272
 the Supreme Court’s first opinion striking down a federal law 
under the Spending Clause. Others may argue that the courts represent the 
most fruitful avenue for systemic education reform rather than the 
legislative or executive branch. In addition, some may contend that my 
proposed theory would reduce some of the benefits of education 
federalism, such as state and local control over education and 
accountability. Another likely objection is that the United States lacks the 
political will to implement this theory. This Part responds to these 
objections and highlights numerous strengths of my proposed theory.  
A. Understanding Why National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius Leaves Ample Constitutional Room for Expanding the Federal 
Role in Education 
Although the Supreme Court in NFIB upheld the mandate requiring 
individuals to acquire health insurance as a valid exercise of the 
congressional authority to tax,
273
 it also held that the Affordable Care 
Act’s penalty on states that chose not to participate in the expansion of the 
Medicaid program was unconstitutionally coercive in violation of the 
Spending Clause.
274
 Until the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB, the 
Court had placed very few limits on Spending Clause authority.
275
 Given 
the shift in the Court’s understanding of the scope of authority under the 
Spending Clause and my reliance on congressional action as one avenue 
for disrupting education federalism, it is important to understand what 
impact this decision could have on my theory.  
 
 
 272. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 273. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion). 
 274. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606–07 (2012) (plurality opinion); id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, J.J., dissenting).  
 275. For a full and thoughtful analysis of the impact of NFIB on federal education law, please see 
Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 584–91. 
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Although the Court established five conditions for Spending Clause 
legislation in South Dakota v. Dole,
276
 with the exception of the 
requirement that conditions must be unambiguous, the Court since Dole 
and prior to NFIB had not applied these conditions to establish meaningful 
substantive limits for Spending Clause legislation.
277
 Prior to NFIB, the 
Court’s minimal enforcement of the requirement that statutory conditions 
may not be so coercive that they become compulsory was generally 
understood to be “[t]he virtual judicial abandonment of coercion 
analysis.”278 With little fear of judicial interference, Congress was able to 
employ its expansive authority under the Spending Clause to enact 
legislation covering a broad variety of areas that it does not possess direct 
authority to regulate, including education, the environment, and social 
welfare issues.
279
 
The Court in NFIB found for the first time that a Spending Clause 
statute had crossed the line from coercion to compulsion.
280
 The plurality 
opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, 
determined that the Medicaid expansion that required the states to insure 
anyone under age sixty-five with an income of less than 133% of the 
federal poverty line was unconstitutionally coercive.
281
 The plurality’s 
analysis focused on several factors to find a constitutional violation, and I 
agree with scholars Eloise Pasachoff and Samuel Bagenstos that the best 
reading of the opinion is that each of these factors must exist for the 
plurality to find a statute unconstitutional.
282
 The plurality first noted that, 
rather than establish new conditions for new funds, Congress threatened to 
 
 
 276. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). The Court required that the conditions for federal spending must: 
(1) benefit the general welfare, (2) be unambiguous, (3) be related to the federal interest in the statute, 
(4) cannot induce the states to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional and 
(5) cannot be so coercive as to pass the point at which “pressure turns into compulsion.” Id. at 207, 
208, 210–11 (internal quotations omitted). 
 277. Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 588–89. On the unambiguous requirement, the Court has insisted 
that states have “clear notice” regarding the conditions for accepting federal funds. See Arlington Cent. 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause 
Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 393–409 (2008); Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 588–
89. Even this limitation did not stop Congress from enacting Spending Clause legislation, as it merely 
established an interpretive rule that requires Spending Clause legislation to be enacted with great 
clarity such that the states fully understand the conditions for receiving federal funds. Pasachoff, supra 
note 22, at 589. 
 278. Heise, supra note 52, at 137. 
 279. Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 589–90. 
 280. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
 281. Id. at 2606–07 (plurality opinion). 
 282. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 864–65; Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 594.  
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withhold both new and existing Medicaid funds if a state did not agree to 
the expansion.
283
 The plurality found that this threat effectively forced 
states to acquiesce to the Medicaid expansion because when the 
“conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant 
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of 
pressuring the states to accept policy changes.”284 This threat triggered an 
analysis by the plurality of whether the threat had crossed the line from 
coercion to compulsion.
285
  
The plurality then determined that the terms were unconstitutionally 
coercive because it considered the threatened loss of all Medicaid funding, 
which accounts for more than ten percent of a State’s total budget, to be 
“economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to 
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion”286 and essentially “a gun to the 
head” of the states.287 Finally, the plurality concluded by noting that 
although the states agreed that Congress could amend or alter Medicaid 
when they accepted Medicaid funds, the requirement that Congress must 
attach unambiguous conditions to federal grants means that Congress 
cannot create “a new health care program” under the guise of merely 
amending the original program.
288
 Given that the Medicaid expansion 
transformed the program from one that serves some of the neediest 
individuals in society to one that provides healthcare for anyone with an 
income below 133% of the poverty line, the states did not agree to this 
dramatic expansion when they agreed that Congress could amend 
Medicaid.
289
  
In contrast to the plurality opinion, the joint dissent, which was one 
vote shy of a majority, focused on one factor—“economic dragooning.”290 
The joint dissent agreed that the statute was unconstitutionally coercive 
because of both the percentage of the total state budgets that would be 
affected as well as the amounts that would be withheld from the states.
291
 
The joint dissent noted that the program at stake in Dole would have 
involved “[w]ithholding $614.7 million, equaling only 0.19% of all state 
 
 
 283. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–04 (plurality opinion). 
 284. Id. at 2604. 
 285. Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 598. 
 286. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion).  
 287. Id. at 2604. 
 288. Id. at 2606. 
 289. Id.  
 290. Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 605–12. 
 291. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62, 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, J.J., dissenting); see 
Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 605–08 (noting both factors as relevant to the joint dissent’s analysis). 
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expenditures combined” and that this amount is appropriately described as 
a “relatively mild encouragement.”292 In contrast, the Affordable Care 
Act’s Medicaid expansion would “threaten[] to withhold $233 billion, 
equaling 21.86% of all state expenditures combined” and thus is 
unambiguously coercive.
293
 The emphasis on the percentage of the state 
budget common to both the plurality and joint dissent suggests that this 
analysis may be the more critical one for future opinions.  
Scholars offer some tentative possibilities about the decision’s potential 
impact on future Spending Clause legislation and how such legislation will 
be administered by federal agencies.
294
 Several scholars contend that the 
decision could potentially invite challenges to an assortment of Spending 
Clause legislation that will seek to establish how much the Court is willing 
to limit this previously broad congressional authority.
295
 Scholars express 
mixed views about the potential success of such challenges
296
 and note the 
decision’s lack of clarity regarding the definition of coercion.297 In 
addition, several scholars posit that the decision will grant states additional 
 
 
 292. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, J.J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 293. Id. 
 294. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative Federalists, 48 TULSA L. 
REV. 427, 442 (2013) (“If the first of these variables—the sheer amount of money involved—turns out 
to be critical, then NFIB’s Spending Clause holding may turn out to be a ticket for this day and train 
only. But if the old money/new money distinction has legs, then this may allow the states to effect 
partial opt-outs from federal spending programs.”); Metzger, supra note 248, at 111–12 (“If these 
limits on Congress’s tax and spending powers turn out to have legs, they could undermine the viability 
of the indirect regulatory options that Chief Justice Roberts defends. Placing significant restrictions on 
funding conditions, or on what can count as a tax, risks rendering these financial inducements 
ineffectual as mechanisms for achieving regulatory aims. . . . But if these new tax and spending limits 
prove largely nominal, Congress will be able to regulate as it wants through money.”). Scholars also 
note the potential impact on the judiciary, including the difficulty of identifying unconstitutional 
coercion after the decision. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: 
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 
6 (2013) (noting how little guidance NFIB provides lower courts for Spending Clause challenges). 
 295. See, e.g., James F. Freeley III, Essay, National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius: The Constitutionality of Health Care Reform and the Spending Clause, 45 CONN. L. REV. 
CONNTEMPLATIONS 19, 27 n.59 (2013); Mark A. Hall, A Healthcare Case for the Ages, 6 J. HEALTH & 
LIFE SCI. L. 1, 11 (2012); Huberfeld et al., supra note 294, at 6. 
 296. Compare Huberfeld et al., supra note 294, at 50 (“Proponents of broad federal power will no 
doubt claim that the decision is sui generis and limited to its particular facts. But both the result and 
the rhetoric in NFIB suggest that it is a launch, not a landing.”), with Metzger, supra note 248, at 114 
(“State claims of coercion seem likely to surface, whether or not they succeed. At a minimum, NFIB 
appears to give states greater leverage in resisting the imposition of new conditions attached to extant 
federal funds. States’ ability to exercise this leverage in court, however, is likely to remain 
constrained.”). 
 297. See Michelle Biddulph & Dwight G. Newman, Comparativist-Structural Approaches to 
Interpretation of the Post-Obamacare Spending Power, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 14–15 
(2012); Huberfeld et al., supra note 294, at 70, 88. 
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leverage to negotiate with federal agencies regarding how Spending 
Clause programs are administered and may lead to additional waivers 
from federal agencies that fear a successful judicial challenge to their 
program under NFIB.
298
  
In considering what NFIB will mean for education federalism, I agree 
with those who contend that education programs within NCLB, as well as 
other major education laws, are likely to be upheld even after NFIB.
299
 As 
states are permitted to select which NCLB programs they want to 
participate in, it is important to analyze the constitutionality of NCLB 
based upon the separate programs that are packaged within the law.
300
 
Title I represents the largest program under NCLB and cost approximately 
$17.114 billion for fiscal year 2011.
301
 For fiscal year 2011, states spent a 
total of $1.672 trillion and thus Title I represents 1.02% of states’ 
budgets.
302
 As education law scholar Eloise Pasachoff previously noted 
when she conducted this analysis, this potential loss is far closer to the 
potential loss to South Dakota that the Court upheld as constitutional in 
Dole than to the threatened loss in NFIB.
303
 In addition, NCLB also avoids 
the NFIB concerns by eliminating the pre-NCLB Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act; thus, new funds are not conditioned on an old 
program.
304
 Given that NCLB represents the most intrusive and extensive 
federal education law in U.S. history, the strong likelihood that the largest 
program within this law is constitutional under NFIB suggests that 
Congress is likely to retain extensive authority to pass additional education 
legislation under the Spending Clause.
305
  
Even after NFIB, Congress enjoys ample constitutional room to 
leverage federal funds to institute this Article’s theory for ensuring equal 
access to an excellent education for several reasons. It is important to note 
that the plurality found the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion to 
 
 
 298. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 907–08; Metzger, supra note 248, at 114–15; Young, supra 
note 294, at 442–43. 
 299. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 892; Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 582.  
 300. Cf. Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 614.  
 301. STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, REVENUES AND 
EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS: SCHOOL YEAR 2010–
11, at 18 tbl.8 (2013). 
 302. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING 
FISCAL 2011–13 STATE SPENDING 7 tbl.1 (2013); see also Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 629 
(conducting the same analysis for 2008–09 using the same data sources).  
 303. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–05 (2012) (plurality 
opinion); Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 622. 
 304. See Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 619. 
 305. For a thoughtful analysis of why the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act would 
remain constitutional under NFIB, please see id. at 633–42.  
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be coercive because of the combined effect of several factors rather than 
any single factor.
306
 Thus, a fair reading of the plurality opinion suggests 
that to run afoul of NFIB, a federal education program would have to take 
a pre-existing, large, well-entrenched program, add new and unforeseen 
conditions that are so substantial as to constitute an independent program, 
and present the possibility of losing all funds for both the old and new as 
conditions for any state not wanting to follow the new conditions.
307
 The 
need to run afoul of multiple concerns simultaneously will leave Congress 
with ample room to enact far-reaching education legislation. 
In addition, both the plurality and the joint dissent reaffirmed the 
ability to attach conditions to the grant of new funds.
308
 Together these 
opinions make clear that a new federal education program that offered new 
funding in exchange for state compliance with conditions for spending 
those funds should easily pass constitutional muster under NFIB. 
Furthermore, such a law would remain constitutional even if the new 
funds and conditions build upon a preexisting federal conditional spending 
program. This is permissible because the plurality and joint dissent both 
indicated approval for attaching new conditions that built upon the prior 
Medicaid program as long as those conditions did not jeopardize the 
previously authorized and accepted Medicaid funds.
309
  
Finally, broad constitutional authority still exists for Congress to ensure 
equal access to an excellent education under the Spending Clause because, 
as the joint dissent noted, even though education spending is the second 
largest federally funded item, the total amount of all federal education 
programs currently represents a relatively small percentage of all state 
expenditures—“only 6.6% of all state expenditures combined.”310 This 
total amount includes a wide variety of federal education programs, 
including Title I and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. This 
percentage pales in comparison to the approximately 22% of total state 
budgets that were allocated to pre-expansion Medicaid.
311
 Even if the 
federal government adopted a generous and robust plan to ensure that all 
 
 
 306. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 864–65; Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 594.  
 307. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 864–65; Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 593–94. The joint 
dissent focused on both the size of the federal grant and the impact on the states’ budgets. NFIB, 132 
S. Ct. at 2661–62, 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, J.J., dissenting). 
 308. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion); id. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, 
JJ., dissenting). 
 309. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion); id. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, 
JJ., dissenting); see Pasachoff, supra note 22, at 657–58. 
 310. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
 311. Id. 
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children receive equal access to an excellent education, it seems very 
unlikely that its funding of one education program would surpass the total 
amount that it spent on a wide variety of elementary and secondary 
education programs.
312
 Therefore, NFIB leaves Congress ample 
constitutional authority to ensure equal access to an excellent education.  
B. Legislative and Executive Authority Provides a More Fruitful Avenue 
for Reform than Judicial Authority 
My theory proposes a framework for how the federal legislative and 
executive branches could lead the United States in a comprehensive effort 
to ensure equal access to an excellent education. I do not recommend that 
the courts should serve as the primary focus for reform for numerous 
reasons. As previously noted, federal courts frequently have relied on 
federalism and the interest in local control of education as a reason for 
curtailing efforts that sought to advance equal educational opportunity.
313
 
Also, as I analyzed in detail in prior scholarship, courts provide an inferior 
forum for education policy reform.
314
 Courts have found a limited ability 
to institute effective school finance reform when their decisions did not 
garner significant political support.
315
 Litigation is oftentimes slow and 
piecemeal and relies on a court order before a state will initiate reform. 
Yet, even in the face of such an order, legislatures can remain resistant to 
change.
316
 Once reform is initiated, court-driven reform also can be 
difficult and laborious if all or even most revisions to the initial plans 
require court approval.
317
 Federal judges often lack substantive knowledge 
of the complex and nuanced education issues.
318
 Furthermore, litigation 
solutions are typically driven by the evidence before the court and thus fail 
to recognize the competing interests of absent affected constituencies.
319
 
 
 
 312. For instance, Goodwin Liu estimated that a federal education program that, among other 
things, would reduce interstate inequality in education spending would cost $30 billion annually in 
additional education spending. See Liu, supra note 3, at 2119–24. Even such a comprehensive and 
substantial federal effort aimed at addressing inequality in education through one program would still 
represent a relatively small percentage of states’ overall budget when compared to the substantial 
percentage that states could have lost in NFIB. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas 
& Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 313. See supra text accompanying notes 101–09. 
 314. See Robinson, supra note 37, at 1715, 1728–35. 
 315. See id. at 1728. 
 316. See id. at 1734. 
 317. See id. at 1730. 
 318. See id. at 1731. 
 319. See id. at 1734. 
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In contrast, federal support, research, and funding for reform can 
provide a counterbalance to state and local insistence on maintaining the 
status quo.
320
 A federal legislative and executive approach can offer 
comprehensive solutions that incentivize actions by all of the states, a feat 
that a litigation effort is unlikely to accomplish.
321
 In contrast to litigation 
that regularly requires court approval for any changes to a remedial order, 
legislative or executive action can offer much-needed flexibility to revisit 
and refine the legislation, regulations, or initiatives that are 
implemented.
322
 Legislative and executive action also would benefit from 
the expertise of federal policymakers who have knowledge of and 
experience in education and its many complexities. Federal policymakers 
can seek input from states, scholars, and policymakers when additional 
expertise and research is needed.
323
 Additionally, the legislative and 
executive process can provide a more comprehensive assessment of the 
problem, the affected constituencies, and possible avenues for reform.
324
  
Perhaps most importantly, a court-centered reform effort would 
undermine the collaborative enforcement approach that is critical for 
sustained and continuous improvement by the states. Litigation would 
introduce an adversarial nature to reform and pit the federal government 
against states and localities.
325
 In contrast, I propose a collaborative 
approach in which the federal, state, and local governments enter a 
shoulder-to-shoulder partnership to ensure consistent improvement 
through federal assistance for state and local reforms.
326
 For these and 
other reasons,
327
 my theory relies upon the legislative and executive 
branches as the avenues for reform. Nevertheless, my theory also could 
inform judicial understanding of the need to reform education federalism 
so that education federalism does not continue to serve as one of the 
obstacles to effective reform.  
 
 
 320. See id. at 1729. 
 321. See id. at 1734. 
 322. See id. at 1730. 
 323. See id. at 1732. 
 324. See id. at 1734. 
 325. See id. at 1733–34. 
 326. See id. 
 327. For the full discussion of why a court-centered reform agenda should not be the focus of 
federal reforms that seek equal educational opportunity, see id. at 1728–34. 
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C. How Disrupting Education Federalism Would Empower New Aspects 
of State and Local Control of and Accountability for Education and 
Encourage Innovation 
Some may critique my proposed theory for reducing state and local 
control of and accountability for education. As analyzed in Part I.B.1, it is 
important to remember that state and local control of education has greatly 
diminished over the last few decades and that scholars have noted that 
local control has not characterized the nation’s schools for quite some 
time.
328
 In addition, local control is not typically considered an end in 
itself. As political scientist Douglas Reed insightfully noted, “Local 
control is a good thing to the extent that it improves educational 
performance and builds strong communities; to the extent that it isolates, 
excludes, and homogenizes our schools, rendering them grossly unequal, 
localism is a problem.”329 Therefore, my theory seeks to reduce harmful 
aspects of state and local control of education while simultaneously 
empowering beneficial and collaborative aspects. 
Under my proposed theory, states admittedly would lose some control 
over education because they would be accountable to the federal 
government for ending longstanding disparities in educational opportunity. 
A hallmark of the American education system has been the freedom that 
mostly affluent parents enjoy: to provide their children a better education 
than the one given to less privileged children.
330
 In addition, some states 
and localities also may contend that they should retain the ability to focus 
their resources on some children rather than spreading them more 
equitably to all children.
331
 I contend that the loss of this type of state and 
local control would benefit the nation’s education system. 
At the same time, other aspects of state and local control of education 
would remain if my theory was adopted. Under this theory, states would 
 
 
 328. See supra text accompanying notes 88–92; see also Ryan, supra note 52, at 60 (“There is a 
popular belief that public schools are locally controlled. As a legal matter, this has always been 
something of a myth.”); Heise, supra note 52, at 131 (“However alluring, such notions of local control 
over America’s school policy have not accurately described the reality of American education policy 
for decades.”). 
 329. DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY 179–80 (2001). 
 330. See JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 138–39 (2003). 
 331. For instance, the state of Texas suggested such an argument when it argued that it should not 
be required to provide an education to children of undocumented immigrants because these students 
are not “persons” protected by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States 
Constitution. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210–14 (1982). 
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retain authority to control education policymaking through education 
governance, the nature and content of a school finance system, state 
assessments and graduation standards, and a wide variety of teaching and 
curricular decisions.
 332
 Localities would continue to administer education, 
manage the daily operation of schools, hire teachers and staff, build and 
maintain schools, and transport students.
333
 Issues such as class size and 
governance would remain within the purview of state and local 
government. Furthermore, maintaining these functions under state and 
local authority fosters continuance of most of the existing levels of state 
and local accountability for education. 
Most importantly, my proposed theory would foster new types of state 
and local control over education. Currently, substantial disparities exist in 
each state’s capacity to offer high-quality educational opportunities.334 The 
absence of federal intervention to address these disparate capacities leaves 
many states without the ability to offer their citizens an excellent 
education. Placing primary responsibility on the federal government for 
leading a national effort to close opportunity and achievement gaps will 
expand state and local control of education because it will provide state 
and local governments both a greater and more equal capacity to offer all 
children an excellent education.
335
 This enhanced capacity will empower 
states and localities to engage in innovative reforms that were previously 
hindered by capacity limitations. In this way, greater equity in the 
distribution of state and local control and equal access to an excellent 
education can co-exist as complementary rather than competing goals. 
Once each state has a more uniform ability to offer equal access to an 
excellent education, the states will decide how they want to achieve this 
goal. By leaving the methods for achieving this goal to the states, my 
theory will preserve the states and localities as laboratories of reform. 
Moreover, these laboratories would have new federal research, technical 
expertise, and financial assistance to support the identification and 
implementation of effective reforms. Therefore, those who believe that 
excellence is best fostered through state and local control may find 
comfort in the fact that under my proposed theory, the states ultimately 
would decide how to ensure equal access to an excellent education.  
 
 
 332. See Ryan, supra note 52, at 57–59. 
 333. See Hill, supra note 46, at 78; Ryan, supra note 52, at 57. 
 334. See COLLISION COURSE, supra note 56, at 49–52; Liu, supra note 3, at 2047. 
 335. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 389 
(2001) (noting that for a central intervention to support the values of local control it must “promote the 
capacity of the local government to adopt policies that current central law frustrates”). 
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Federal reform consistent with my theory for disrupting education 
federalism might diminish some state and local accountability for 
education. Once the federal government takes responsibility as the final 
guarantor of equal access to an excellent education and thereafter monitors 
state progress toward achieving this goal, the public will begin to hold the 
federal government accountable for educational disparities. This 
accountability is more diffuse and less effective than state and local 
accountability because federal officials are more removed from state and 
local electorates and are held accountable for a wider range of decisions.
336
  
However, it is important to note two responses to this concern. First, 
the public has not effectively held state and local officials accountable for 
closing opportunity gaps. For that reason, adding an additional layer of 
accountability—even a diffuse layer—could facilitate achievement of this 
objective. Second, as noted above, this proposed theory would not remove 
state and local accountability for ensuring equal access to an excellent 
education. Instead, state and local officials would be charged with 
designing and implementing plans to achieve this goal and thus critical 
aspects of state and local accountability would be preserved.
337
 Federal 
officials would be responsible for offering some of the incentives, 
research, expertise, and financial support that is needed to accomplish this 
objective. In these ways, my proposed theory ultimately would increase 
total government accountability for achieving this goal. For these reasons, 
it would more effectively reap some of the benefits that education 
federalism is designed to achieve. 
D. Building the Political Will for Education Reform that Ensures Equal 
Access to an Excellent Education 
Additional objections to my theory may focus on the lack of political 
will to adopt it. Some may argue that the nation is not ready to do what it 
takes to complete a comprehensive assault on opportunity and 
achievement gaps. My proposed theory is intentionally unapologetic in its 
comprehensive and aspirational scope. Its comprehensive nature seeks to 
address the fact that past education reforms have not attempted to address 
the magnitude of the problem confronting the nation.
338
 It leverages the 
expanding federal role in education as the opportune time to restructure 
 
 
 336. See Ryan, supra note 100, at 607. 
 337. See Adler, supra note 177, at 204. 
 338. See Michael A. Rebell, The Need for Comprehensive Educational Equality, in THE PRICE WE 
PAY, supra note 10, at 255, 257; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 14. 
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education federalism in ways that support the nation’s education goals. As 
leading education historian Carl Kaestle has noted, “Presidents and 
Congress will continue to reinvent the federal role, because education has 
become a top-tier domestic agenda item and because federalist traditions 
do not make clear what the federal role in education is, nor how reformers 
should proceed to improve education on a national scale.”339 As the federal 
role in education continues to expand, this Article seeks to supply some of 
the critical answers that debates on education reform lack regarding how 
education federalism should be restructured to support effective, 
comprehensive reform. 
Although this theory is aspirational because the United States currently 
lacks sufficient political will to adopt all aspects of my theory, I seek to 
contribute to the growing momentum for reform
340
 in several ways. I want 
to spark a national dialogue about why changing education federalism 
should be included among the education reform conversations. The public 
needs to understand the many costs that the United States has paid for its 
approach to education federalism. The United States also needs to adopt a 
research-driven basis for how education federalism should be restructured 
to achieve the nation’s education goals. My theory injects the foundational 
issue of education federalism and how it must be restructured as a critical 
missing element of the ongoing education reform agenda.  
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE FUTURE  
My theory for reconstructing education federalism envisions the 
federal, state, and local governments joining together in a shoulder-to-
shoulder partnership to build an education system in which all 
schoolchildren receive equal access to an excellent education. By 
establishing the federal government as the final guarantor of equal 
educational opportunity, it offers innovative ways to empower and 
incentivize state and local governments to close opportunity and 
achievement gaps. It would require the federal government both to 
demand much from state and local governments and give much to them. 
 
 
 339. See Kaestle, supra note 41, at 37. 
 340. See, e.g., WENDY KOPP, A CHANCE TO MAKE HISTORY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T 
IN PROVIDING AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION FOR ALL 207–08 (2012); QUALITY EDUCATION AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: CREATING A GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
(Theresa Perry et al. eds., 2010); S. EDUC. FOUND., NO TIME TO LOSE: WHY AMERICA NEEDS AN 
EDUCATION AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO IMPROVE PUBLIC EDUCATION (2009); 
EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
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My theory is particularly timely because it is offered at a time when the 
nation has already begun to embrace a historic expansion of the federal 
role in education.
341
 A substantial federal role in education is likely to 
continue because it generally enjoys bipartisan support as well as support 
from the business community, civil rights groups, and many other 
Americans.
342
 Although support for federal involvement in education has 
been growing, the United States has lacked a theory for how this role 
should evolve.
343
 Several scholars and the Equity and Excellence 
Commission have offered a variety of proposals for how the federal role in 
education should be strengthened to advance equal educational 
opportunity.
344
 I offer a theory of education federalism that could guide 
implementation of such proposals by analyzing how the nation should 
improve upon the strengths of federal education policymaking and 
identifying critical missing components of an effective reform movement. 
Disrupting the nation’s longstanding approach to education federalism 
and reconstructing it in ways that support the nation’s education goals will 
be essential to successful education reform. Federal education law and 
policy built upon my theory would restructure education federalism in 
ways that support closing opportunity gaps. Closing these gaps is essential 
to closing achievement gaps and thereby enabling all children to enjoy the 
possibilities of the American dream. Research reveals that closing 
achievement gaps would both greatly increase the nation’s economic 
growth and lead to future economic strength and competitiveness of the 
U.S. economy.
345
 As the United States continues to search for new ways to 
expand educational opportunity and improve educational quality, my 
theory offers some pioneering ideas for moving our national dialogue 
away from educational paralysis and toward educational excellence. 
 
 
 341. See MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 179, 202; Jacobsen & Saultz, supra note 70, at 384. 
 342. See MCGUINN, supra note 30, at 192; REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 147; Jacobsen & 
Saultz, supra note 70, at 384. 
 343. See Kaestle, supra note 41, at 17. 
 344. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 8, at 152–55; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, 
supra note 1, at 34–35; Liu, supra note 3, at 2049; Robinson, supra note 37, at 1715–22. 
 345. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 1 (“[T]he real scourge of the 
U.S. education system—and its greatest competitive weakness—is the deep and growing achievement 
gap between socioeconomic groups that begins early and lasts through a student’s academic career. . . . 
It is an economist’s rule that an increase of one year in a country’s average schooling level 
corresponds to an increase of 3 to 4 percent in long-term economic growth.”); EQUITY & EXCELLENCE 
COMM’N, supra note 1, at 13 (“If Hispanic and African American student performance grew to be 
comparable to white performance and remained there over the next 80 years, the historical evidence 
indicates that the impact would be staggering—adding some $50 trillion (in present value terms) to our 
economy.”). 
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